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The world that we must seek is a world in which
the creative spirit is alive, in which life is an
adventure full of joy and hope, based rather upon
the impulse to construct than upon the desire to
retain what we possess or to seize what is
possessed by others. It must be a world in which
affection has free play, in which love is purged of
the instinct for domination, in which cruelty and
envy have been dispelled by happiness and the
unfettered development of all the instincts that
build up life and fill it with mental delights. Such a
world is possible; it waits only for [wo]men to
wish to create it.
Bertrand Russell, Roads To Freedom

1 Introduction
A new mode of production has emerged in the areas of
software and content production during the last decades.
This mode, which is based on sharing and cooperation, has
spawned whole mature operating systems such as GNU/Linux
and various BSD systems as well as innumerable other free
software applications, some of which form the backbones of
the Internet or the core of various enterprises; giant knowledge
bases such as the Wikipedia; a large free culture movement
often based on Creative Commons licenses; and a new, wholly
decentralized medium for spreading, analyzing and discussing
news and knowledge, the so-called blogosphere; among oth-
ers.
Yochai Benkler has coined the term peer production to de-
scribe this collaborative and open mode of production which
has become typical for the Internet in recent years (Benkler,
2002; 2006). Benkler makes it clear that peer production (or its
generalization, social production) is a third mode of production
that is fundamentally different from both market-based pro-
duction and firm production. Market systems are based on
equivalent exchange (with or sometimes without money), while
firms (and also the former “socialist” planned economies such
as the Soviet Union) rely on hierarchies and organized plan-
ning to distribute tasks and resources.
Peer production, on the other hand, is based on contributions.
People contribute to a project because they want it to succeed,
not because they need to earn money or have to realize some
previously established plan. Some peer projects require contri-
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butions (peer-to-peer distribution networks such as BitTorrent
require downloaders to upload), while others are open even to
non-contributors (you do not have to write any free software
to be allowed to use it). Often projects are partially, but not
completely open; large free software and open content projects
usually allow only active participants to take part in decision
making processes, but everyone is allowed to access, distribute,
and modify the produced information.
While Benkler has identified social production and peer pro-
duction as important phenomena, he appears to consider them
relevant only for certain niches of production, such as informa-
tion goods. In this text we will discuss whether this limitation
to niches—even important niches such as information goods—
is justified or whether it under-estimates the potential of peer
production. To put it in other words: Is a society possible in
which peer production is the primary mode of production? If
so, how could such a society be organized?
In the next two chapters, we will discuss several important
characteristics of peer production and introduce the major
problems that need to be addressed for generalizing peer
production beyond the sphere of information. In Chapter 4 we
will investigate how these problems can be addressed within
the context of individual peer projects, finding that there are
indeed suitable solutions. In Chapter 5 we will turn from
the internal organization of peer projects to the “big picture,”
discussing how a multitude of such projects might fit together
in a society where peer production is the primary mode of
production.
Finding that such a society is feasible, we will in Chapter 6
compare it with societies based on market production and on
planned production, the two economic modes that have been
dominant during the last centuries. We will show that there are
striking differences to both of them, and that a society based on
10
peer production would grant people an unprecedented amount
of control over their own lives, while avoiding the overhead,
arbitrariness, or unfairness characteristic of other modes of
production. Prior to concluding the text, we will examine how
the people living in such a society might organize various
aspects of their lives (Chap. 7), and we will address several
concerns that might be brought forward in regard to such a
peer economy (Chap. 8).
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2 Elements of Peer Production
We will start our investigations by briefly treating some char-
acteristic elements of the peer mode of production.
To prevent confusion about our use of the term production
we would like to point out that we will use this term in a
broad sense that can include any activities related to creating
or doing something that is of use to anybody. Production in
this sense comprises not just the design and manufacturing of
new things, but also repair and maintenance, services of any
kind, domestic work, etc.
Benkler differentiates between peer production and social pro-
duction, regarding the former as a subset of the latter. We
will not follow this distinction and use both terms largely
synonymously.
2.1 Commons, Sharing, and Control over the Means of
Production
Benkler uses the term commons-based peer production to de-
scribe the kind of peer production that has emerged on the
Internet (free software, centralized or decentralized open con-
tent projects such as the Wikipedia and the blogosphere, dis-
tributed computing projects such as SETI@home, etc.). Com-
mons are resources without owners who can control how they
can be used; resources that are available to all who want to
use them. The output of such peer projects generally becomes
part of the commons, being freely available to everybody (or,
at least, to everybody involved in the project).
13
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In current peer projects, the resources required for these
projects (“means of production” such as computing power
and Internet access) are usually privately owned but readily
available to all participants. Peer production thus fulfills the
old Marxist postulate that control over the means of production
should be in the hands of the producers: the means of production
are available either as commons (peer projects can build upon
the code and content produced by other projects) or as some
kind of pseudo-commons (resources that are readily available to
those who use them).
Information can be copied at almost zero cost, thus, being
shared, it is still as available to the sharer as before. Some
peer projects also involve the sharing of other resources which
lack this property, but they do so in a pragmatic way which
does not place a serious burden on the sharer. People partici-
pating in a wireless community network share their spurious
networking capacity; the participants of shared computation
projects such as SETI@home1 donate computing power they
don’t need for any other purposes. This sharing philosophy
might be expressed as “Share what you can”—sharing is com-
monplace, but nobody expects other people to give to others
what they need for themselves. As Richard Stallman (2002,
p. 46) puts it: “When I cook spaghetti, I do object if someone
else eats it, because then I cannot eat it.”
2.2 Free Cooperation
Cooperation is essential for many human activities—for all ac-
tivities that cannot or are not handled by a single person. In
a corporate or state context, cooperation usually contains an
1 http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/
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element of coercion—there is somebody who can tell you what
to do, and then you should better do it, or else. . . .
In peer production, this moment of coercion is notably ab-
sent. Nobody can order others to do something, and nobody
is forced to obey others. This does not mean that there are no
structures—on the contrary, usually there are maintainers or
admins or some other persons who can decide, for example,
which contributions to accept and which to refuse. But nobody
can compel others to do anything they do not want to do.
Moreover, all members of a project participate because of
their own choice. You don’t have to participate in a project,
and there are no sanctions when you leave it.
Goals and internal organization of a project depend on the
participants and will generally evolve along with a project. If
some of the participants of a project are unhappy about some
aspects of the project and cannot convince the others to change
them, they can still fork the project: they can break away from
the others and do their own thing.
Obviously, these traits of cooperation in a peer context can-
not override the rules of the corporate world. In many large
free software projects some of the development work is paid
for by companies. For such paid developers, the normal rules
of firms continue to apply—employees must obey their su-
periors, freelancers are bound to the contract they agreed to.
But those who participate in a peer project without being paid
for it, cooperate freely and are not subjected to anybody’s
command.
2.3 From Status to Reputation
In market economies (and also in planned economies such as
the former Soviet Union), the social position and social status of
a person tend to be important both as driving forces (people
15
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strive to increase their status) and as factors for judging others.
In peer projects, reputation plays a similar role (cf. Lehmann,
2004).
Formal criteria such as job title or academic degree tend
to be of little interest for peer projects; inborn characteristics,
such as gender, “race,” or age, are often not even known.
Instead, people are judged by their contributions, and both
the quality of contributions (developers writing good code)
and the initiative of contributors (founding a new successful
project) tend to increase a person’s reputation.
Reputation is often more volatile than social status; it will
suffer more quickly if people start misbehaving or making
dubious or awkward contributions instead of helpful ones
(this seems to have happened to Eric Raymond, a former star
of the open source movement, at least to a certain degree).
Project maintainers are expected to “do the right thing;” if
the members of a project feel their decisions to be unfair or
incompetent, they will sooner or later leave the project or start
looking for a new maintainer.
Complementary to the decreased significance of social sta-
tus, “status symbols,” objects meant to imply a high social
status of their owner, seem to lose importance. This is not
surprising, since such symbols, which in a market economy
usually indicate material wealth, can hardly indicate a per-
son’s reputation. Also, as stated above, peer production is
largely centered around the concepts of commons, resources
that are available to all; and where things are readily available
for anyone who wants them, status symbols become rather
pointless.
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After having quickly covered some of the traits we can observe
for the current practice of peer production in the areas of
software and content production, we will now turn to the
problems that so far have limited the scope of this mode of
production. There appear to be two fundamental problems
that would need to be solved to generalize peer production
into further areas of the physical world, beyond information
production:
1. How to coordinate the producer side (“fun and passion”)
of peer production with the consumer side (“needs and
desires”)?
2. How to allocate limited resources and goods?
We will discuss each of these problems in turn.
3.1 How to Coordinate the Producer Side with the
Consumer Side?
In any system of production and social organization, two
roles of people can be distinguished: producers who create
or provide goods (including services), and consumers who
consume or use them. These two roles are not necessarily
separate—people can be both producers and consumers at the
same time (“prosumers”), but neither can they be expected to
always fall together. Especially in regard to public services
such as education, health care, and elder care, it is evident that
the “consumers” of such services cannot generally be the same
people that provide them.
17
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Peer production, as we know it today, is mainly producer-
driven: it relies on the choices and motivations of people acting
as producers in what they want to produce. In many cases,
these producers are also consumers (free software developers
contribute to software they need or want to use), but people
who cannot create what they want to use are generally out of
luck; they cannot do much more than hope that somebody
will pick up their needs.
This also affects the output of peer production processes—
most free software programs, for example, are still far less
user-friendly for the general public than proprietary programs;
exceptions, such as the major Linux distributions, the Firefox
browser and the Thunderbird e-mail client, or the OpenOffice
suite, usually involve commercial players—they are partially
driven by market forces, not pure examples of peer production.
Peer producers act out of fun, passion, and the desire to do
something useful and to “give something back” to the com-
munity, as analyzed by Linus Torvalds and Pekka Himanen
(Himanen, 2001) and by Lakhani and Wolf (2005), among oth-
ers. They do what they do because they like doing it, because
they love solving interesting problems, being creative, and cre-
ating something useful. Prosumers “scratch an itch,” solving
problems they wish to be solved in a way that is useful to
others as well as to them, since in this way they are likely to
get better results, by inciting others to contribute as well.
Such motivations will certainly remain fundamental driving
forces, but peer production will hardly become the dominant
mode of production unless there is a way to synchronize it with
the other side of people—with people as users or consumers,
people who have needs which they like to have satisfied even if
they lack the knowledge or faculties to satisfy them themselves.
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3.2 How to Allocate Limited Resources and Goods?
The second issue that needs to be addressed concerns the
allocation and distribution of resources and goods that cannot
be made available in sufficient amount to satisfy all needs. For
information goods, this is not an issue, since (aside from legal
obstacles) they can be copied as often as wished at practically
zero cost. Material goods, however, are very different in this
regard.
Personal fabricators, or fabbers (Gershenfeld, 2005), are an
emergent technology that promises to make (at least some)
material goods as easily and cheaply copyable as information
goods. But while we can expect this technology to alleviate
the problem of producing material goods at some point in the
future, it will never fully solve it.
If peer production were only a viable option for copyable
goods, generalizing it into the physical world would not be
possible until fabbers have become sufficiently advanced. This
might be the case in a few decades, or a few centuries, or
maybe never. Even then, fabbers will need some resources
to work, they will need to be produced and maintained, and
they will hardly be able to produce everything. Hence, fabbers
are unlikely to ever solve the problem of material production
completely.
But let’s assume that, at some point in the future, fabbers
will be able to produce everything (including “big stuff” such
as houses) without needing resources that are not already
freely available to everyone. Even then, fabbers would not
be able to solve all problems regarding material production
and allocation. There are properties that cannot be copied,
such as location. Even if fabbing were able to provide attractive
apartments and houses for anyone who wants them, dwellings
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with sea view would remain a limited good, especially those
that are near an attractive city center.
Rivalness is another problem regarding allocation that fab-
bers cannot solve—if everybody has their own car, nobody
will get very far in it, because of all those jams. Then there are
issues such as environmental damages caused by too many
people using the same products. Clearly, while fabbing is an
interesting technology that deserves attention, it will never be-
come a “deus ex machina” able to solve all relevant problems.
20
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Fabbing would allow an individual mode of production, where
everybody would be able to produce what they need on their
own, without the help of others. Without such an “autonomy”
technology, people either have to rely on the market to buy
what they need (assuming they can afford it), or else they
need to cooperate with others, to jointly produce what they
want to have, and to share and divide the results of this shared
production process in a way that is acceptable to everyone
involved.
People involved in shared production need to address sev-
eral issues, which we will discuss in turn: they need to find
others that are willing to cooperate; they need to find ways
of obtaining sufficient contributions and ensuring that all re-
quired tasks are handled; and they have to find ways of as-
signing the produced results that are acceptable to everyone
involved. In this chapter, we will regard these problems from
the perspective of a single project; how to generalize the found
solutions beyond this context will be discussed in the next
chapter.
4.1 How to Find Others for Cooperation
There are two ways in which people tend to find other people
for this process of cooperation: by common interest, or by
location.
Finding others by common interest is the typical way in which
the current Internet-based peer production processes tend
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to organize themselves: people contribute to free software
programs they like or need; they write for the Wikipedia or
other suitable forums about their topics of interest; they create
and remix free music or other kinds of free culture in the styles
and of the kinds they care about.
The alternative is finding others by location, i.e., cooperat-
ing with people in your neighborhood. This style of shared
production is very old—it has probably been an element in
the evolvement of social structures up from ancient times (cf.
Sahlins, 1974, esp. pp. 74–95, 185–230).
The two alternatives do not exclude each other. There are
peer projects where both interest and location matter, for exam-
ple, book-sharing communities such as the Distributed Library
Project1.
In a society where shared production is the primary mode of
production, we can expect both modes of finding others to be
employed. There are things that concern all the people living
in a specific area, such as the providing and maintenance of
infrastructure, hence we may assume that everybody would
be a member of a local community or some other kind of local
association organizing these issues. And people with specific
interests would continue to search others with similar interests
and cooperate with them in the context of peer projects, just as
they do now.
4.2 How to Obtain Contributions
As mentioned above, shared production is a very old mode
of production; it has already figured in the lives of hunter-
gatherer societies thousands of years ago. Since then, however,
1 http://dlp.theps.net/
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work has become more and more complex. Division of labor
might not have been much of an issue in ancient societies, but
it is essential for modern society.
In hunter-gatherer-style societies, what little specialization
there was was usually assigned by tradition—tasks were dis-
tributed based on criteria such as gender (men were assumed
to be hunters, women had to gather edible plants and to care
for the children) or inheritance (the oldest son or child of
a chief or shaman would become his successor). Obviously,
such a tradition-based assigning of tasks would be unaccept-
able by modern standards; moreover, it would be completely
insufficient to handle the complex division of labor we see
today.
So how can peer projects and communities organize the
internal division of labor; how can they ensure that all tasks
are picked up?
Current peer projects usually rely on voluntarism: contrib-
utors choose a task or tasks they want to do among all open
tasks (e.g., writing a new feature, fixing a bug, writing doc-
umentation, or testing, in case of a free software project);
everybody contributes voluntarily as much (or as little) effort
as they want.
Voluntarism is very reasonable for the production of certain
goods, especially those that can be duplicated at near-zero
cost, such as information goods—it would not make sense for
the Wikipedia to exclude non-editors from reading articles.
However, it is unclear how it should apply to the production
of material goods where the production of additional units
does cause additional non-trivial costs. A peer project aimed
at producing cars (not just the design, but actual running
vehicles) will hardly be able to hand over a car to everyone
who wants one, whether they contribute anything or not—
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even if the contributing members of the project were willing
to do so, they would lack the necessary resources, so they will
have to ask for some contribution in return.
Similarly, while local communities based entirely on volun-
tarism might be possible, it is hard to imagine that they would
be stable. The organization of a community is very complex
and involves a lot of tasks, not all of which are nice to do.
There are tasks such as garbage removal which will proba-
bly be disagreeable to most people and are unlikely to draw
sufficient volunteers.
Without volunteers, a community would fall into disarray;
but even if some people volunteer for such disagreeable tasks,
they would probably do so out of a sense of responsibility for
the community, not because they like the task. This would
lead to the risk of increased psychological strain within the
community—the volunteers for the unpleasant jobs would
most likely resent those who perform only agreeable tasks (or
no tasks at all) and get away with it.
Peer projects and communities will therefore have to decide
whether or not they require contributions from those who want
to benefit from the cooperation (at least in regard to material
benefits—information, as stated before, can be shared freely
since sharing it does not cause additional cost). A simple
way to do this would be to ask all participants to contribute
a certain amount of hours (per month or some other suitable
unit) to the project, letting contributors choose which tasks
they want to handle. While such a flat labor approach might be
suitable for some projects, it fails to address the observation
made above: while people have widely different preferences
about what they do and do not like, there are some tasks
that nobody or almost nobody likes to do, because they are
annoying, dirty, dangerous, or just plain boring.
If a project wants to be successful, it needs a way to cope
24
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with such tasks, and generally to take people’s preferences
into account. In the next section we will discuss ways of doing
this.
4.3 How to Ensure That Tasks Are Handled
There appear to be at least three strategies peer projects can
use in regard to unpleasant tasks:
1. Automate them away;
2. Make them more fun (more agreeable, more interesting,
safer, easier);
3. Make them shorter (by weighting them higher).
We suppose that all of these strategies would be employed
in a society that relies primarily on peer production.
4.3.1 Automation
The power of automation has already shown amazing results
during the last centuries. Various professions such as typeset-
ters have become obsolete through the use of computers; in
1900, 38% of the U.S. labor force were occupied with farming;
in 2000, this fraction had fallen below 3% (National Academy
of Engineering, 2007); modern factories require only a small
fraction of the labor of 18th century manufactories to produce
items whose complexity would have been inconceivable even
50 years ago. There is little reason to assume that the possi-
bilities of automation are already near a climax—more likely,
it will continue to increase in the future, further reducing the
amount of human work necessary to handle many tasks.
But in market-based systems, automation cannot reach its
full potential especially in regard to unpleasant tasks. In mar-
ket production, automation needs to be cost-efficient to be
successful: the costs of introducing and using an automation
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technology must be lower (in the medium or long run) than
the costs of the human labor it will supplant; otherwise com-
panies that do not automatize will be able to produce cheaper
than those that do and can thus expect more success in the
marketplace (all other factors being equal). Hence, the lower
paid a job is, the lower are the margins for successful automa-
tion. For reasons that are beyond the scope of this text, the
unpleasant jobs are often ill-paid as well (think of garbage
collectors or cleaners, for example). The market thus offers
little incentives for automating them.
Shared production is very different in this regard—if all
the members of a peer project want to avoid a specific task,
they might spend considerable effort to get rid of it (or at
least to reduce the amount or unpleasantness of the necessary
work). Of course, they might also decide that it’s not worth
the trouble and instead agree on a mode of distributing the
unpleasant work that’s acceptable to all—but this decision will
be up to them, depending only on their own preferences, not
on market forces.
4.3.2 Fun
Another strategy that peer projects can use in dealing with un-
pleasant tasks that cannot (yet) be automated away is to make
them more pleasant. There are many possibilities here that de-
pend on the nature of the task: unsafe working conditions can
be made safer; obnoxious work schedules can be abandoned
(currently, office cleaners usually have to work very early or
very late so as not to disrupt office work, but there are little
reasons for peer projects to continue this practice); generally,
many tasks can be made more fun, more interesting, more
challenging than they are now—especially when those who do
the task decide on how to do it, as is normal for peer projects.
26
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Again, the options of peer projects in this regard extend far
beyond what is possible on the market. In markets, the lowest
bidder usually wins, so corporations will generally be unable
to take any measure for making working conditions safer or
more enjoyable that would increase the cost of production un-
less their competitors are forced to follow (e.g., by law). And
corporations have little incentive to make working conditions
more attractive as long as they find sufficient applicants des-
perate even for bad jobs. Peer producers, however, do not have
to underbid their competition; they have both the incentive
and the means to make their work more agreeable.
4.3.3 Weighted Labor (Task Auctioning)
While automation and fun are ways of lightening the tasks that
the members of a peer project have to handle, they don’t yet
solve the problem posed in Section 3.1: they don’t bring the
consumer side of the members of a project (who want certain
tasks to be done) in accord with their producer side (who
prefer doing certain tasks over doing others). If every member
of a project chooses freely their preferred tasks (producer
side) among all available tasks (consumer side), the sum of all
those independent producer decisions is unlikely to match the
summed preferences of the consumer side; in general, some
tasks will attract more volunteers than necessary, while there
won’t be enough volunteers for other tasks.
It would be possible to solve this problem through mech-
anisms such as “first come, first serve” (if there are more
applicants than needed for a certain task, those that applied
last will have to choose again among the less popular tasks)
or drawing lots. However, such proposals don’t sound very
attractive. They would mean that some people end up doing
what they really want to do, while others have to content
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themselves with their second choices (or worse), just because
of bad luck or because they didn’t hurry enough.
Is there a better way? Can the members of a peer project find
a way of matching their collective preferences as producers
with their collective preferences as consumers that allows
everyone to choose which tasks they prefer to do and still
ensures that all the required tasks will actually get done?
To answer this question, we need to realize that there is
another dimension in regard to which preferences differ: time.
People’s preferences vary not just in regard to the tasks they
like to do, but also in regard to the time they are willing to
spend for a project. An unpleasant task gets more pleasant
if it takes a shorter amount of somebody’s time, giving them
more time to pursue other interesting projects, to socialize
with or make love to other people, or just be lazy. If I have to
decide whether I prefer spending the same amount of time on
a task I like more (say, writing software) or one I like less (say,
removing garbage), it won’t take me long to choose the former.
But if the question is whether I spend 20 hours a week writing
software or five hours a week removing garbage, I’m likely to
have second thoughts (cf. Fig. 4.1).
Computers make it easy to automatically match people’s
preferences along these two dimensions (their producer pref-
erences) with the tasks they want to have handled (their con-
sumer preferences). A peer project can set up a task auctioning
system where the participants can choose the tasks they prefer
doing among all available tasks. Tasks that don’t attract suffi-
cient volunteers are then weighted higher (i.e., people picking
them up will have to do less work for the project) until there
are enough people willing to accept the time/task trade-off.
Similarly, tasks which are more popular than necessary are
weighted lower, so the people who want to do them will have
to reconsider whether they prefer spending more time with
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Figure 4.1: Weighted labor
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this task or whether there isn’t another task they also like
doing that gives them more time for other activities.
Thus, a weighted hour of labor could be used as unit for
measuring contributions. During a month or a year, all the
members of a project (except those who are exempted from
contributing, cf. Sec. 8.1.1) will be expected to contribute the
same amount of weighted hours—the amount that is necessary
to ensure that all tasks have been handled. Depending on
the tasks people choose to do, this equal amount of weighted
hours will correspond to an amount of actually worked hours
that might be considerably higher (for very popular tasks) or
lower (for unpopular tasks).
Such a task auctioning mechanism is a way to ensure that
all relevant tasks are handled, while at the same time allowing
everybody to freely choose the activities they prefer; nobody
is forced into doing or not doing certain things. It takes care
not only of unpleasant tasks, but also of tasks that require
special talents or skills that only few people possess. Provided
there is more demand for such tasks than volunteers able to do
them, they will automatically be weighted higher, increasing
the motivation for people with the required talents to use them
rather than do something everybody else could do as well.
There are many variations in how exactly such a system can
be realized. Projects might choose to set an upper limit for
the weights of tasks. If some tasks reach this upper limit and
remain unassigned, the project members will have to decide
how to proceed: they could choose to raise the limit; they
could agree to distribute such unpopular tasks evenly among
all participants so everybody will have to do their share of
them now and then; in some cases they might just decide to do
without them. Similarly, projects might choose to impose lower
limits for the weights and use other procedures to decide if
there are still too many applicants for such tasks (such as “first
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come, first serve,” drawing lots, “job” interviews, or elections).
Generally, just because a person wants to do something does
not mean that others will trust them to do it well, hence not
every contribution somebody is willing to provide will be
accepted by the peer project (just like today’s peer projects
don’t automatically accept any contributions). We will discuss
this issue in Section 8.1.3.
A large part, but not all of the contributions required for
shared production are labor, but to figure out how non-labor
resources can be brought into a project we need to see the
big picture. This will happen in Chapter 5. Those who are
interested in the gory mathematical details of the auction-
ing mechanisms proposed in this text will find them in the
appendix (A).
4.4 How to Assign Results of a Project
4.4.1 Share What You Can
We have seen above (Sec. 2.1) that peer production is charac-
terized by an approach to sharing that is both generous and
pragmatic. People will generally share what they can without
suffering a serious loss, but there is no pressure to relinquish
what you want to use yourself.
We can assume that this practice of generously sharing what
can easily be shared will continue, there being no indications to
the contrary. Peer projects will probably continue to share non-
personal information (where there are no privacy concerns)
with the members of other projects and the general public
without imposing serious restrictions.
The one restriction that is frequent in current peer pro-
duction is to require that modified versions also stay in the
commons (share-alike or copyleft clause); another restriction that
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is seldom applied to software, but more often to content is to
forbid others from using shared information for purposes of
market production (non-commercial clause). These restrictions
are imposed by some peer projects but not by others, and we
can expect this mixed attitude toward them to continue into
the future.
The non-commercial restriction would become irrelevant in
an economic system where peer production is the only mode
of production, but not earlier. The share-alike condition will
always remain significant since it grants any users a right to
access and use the source code (the preferred form of a work for
making modifications to it) of modified versions of a work—an
option that they might not have otherwise, since people could
decide to modify a work and distribute their modified version
only in binary form (unsuitable for further modification).
4.4.2 But What About the Rest?
Generally, sharing does not scale quite as efficiently as the
sharing of information. A spaghetti-cooking project will hardly
be able to share the output of their activities with everybody
who wants spaghetti; when in doubt, they will prefer to eat
the cooked spaghetti themselves instead of staying hungry. So,
the contributors to a peer project producing something that
cannot easily be shared with everybody else will often share
only among themselves.
In which ways can they organize this internal sharing?
We will discuss several possible modes. These modes do
not necessarily conflict with each other and can be combined.
Which of these modes makes most sense depends on what is
produced and on the preferences of the prosumers.
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4.4.2.1 Flat Rates
The spaghetti-cooking group points to one obvious answer to
the sharing problem: most likely they will not put any specific
restrictions on how much spaghetti a group member may eat.
Instead, while every participant will be expected to contribute
in some way or other to cooking the food and organizing the
dinner, all the contributors are allowed to eat how much or
how little they like, until the spaghetti is all used up. Dinners
or parties of friends are often organized in this way, reminding
us that social production is nothing new but has been with us,
though largely invisible, for a long time.
We will refer to this model as the flat rate model since it
resembles the flat pricing schemas that have become popular
for broadband Internet access and (at least in some countries)
for phone calls. In other domains, different names such as
“all-inclusive” travel and “All you can eat” restaurants are
used for what is essentially the same phenomenon; public
transportation services often offer monthly or yearly tickets
for a flat fee.
In a market-based economy these models have in common
that a single fixed fee is charged for a service, regardless of
actual usage. For the provider, such flat pricing models are
often easier to manage than more fine-grained accounting
mechanisms; for the users they are often cheaper and, in any
case, more convenient, since the exact costs are known in
advance.
In peer production, the equivalent model means that a flat
amount of contributions is required and that everybody who
contributes sufficiently to a peer project can choose freely from
the results of the project.
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4.4.2.2 Flat Allocation
Let us turn from the spaghetti-cooking group to other peer
projects. How could, for example, a car-producing project
allocate the produced items? A project that is building actual,
physical cars, not just the design of a car (as is the goal of the
OScar2 and c,mm,n3 projects)?
Probably they wouldn’t be very happy with a flat rate model
where everybody contributes a roughly equal amount but then
takes one, two, or any number of the produced cars, just as
they like. Some of those who would need only a single car
(probably the large majority) would be annoyed about having
to work more so others can take more cars; they might be
tempted to take more cars than they actually need to make up
for it or to save for the future. Some people would take more
cars than they need for themselves and give them to friends
who haven’t contributed anything to the project. Bad feelings,
or worse, would result.
The project can avoid this problem by choosing a flat al-
location model instead of a flat rate model: everybody will
get just one car (instead of any number of cars) for a certain
amount of contributions. Those who want two cars will have
to contribute twice as much, and so on. This also removes any
reasons for mistrust whether participants are producing for
themselves or for others; they can donate the produced items
to their friends without harming or annoying anyone else in
the project.
This flat allocation model, where everybody gets a produced
unit (e.g., a car) for a certain amount of contributions, will
be especially appropriate for the production of discrete items
2 http://www.theoscarproject.org/
3 http://www.autoindetoekomst.nl/website/
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(such as cars or computers) where all the produced items are
roughly equivalent in terms of production effort.
4.4.2.3 Customized Production and Preference Choice
(Production Effort)
What if things become more complicated than either a flat
rate or a flat allocation model can handle? Think, for example,
on the question of housing. Not all houses and apartments
are created equal, and there is no way in which this could
be “fixed” (think of sea view). Nor, actually, is there a reason
why it should be “fixed”—some people might prefer large
luxurious houses and might be ready to put a large effort into
getting them; others might be happy with smaller or simpler
apartments, preferring to spend their time and effort for other
purposes.
A peer project or community organizing housing for its
members will need to take variety in the produced items
(houses or apartments) as well as the differing preferences of
its members into account. “One size fits all” won’t do it.
A partial answer comes from the fact that the relative pro-
duction efforts that are required for the production of various
items will be known, especially if a weighted labor model of
task distribution is used (cf. Sec. 4.3.3). This allows a peer
project to customize its production according to the wishes
of each participant, even when such custom-made products
require a production effort that is higher or lower than the
average—in such cases, the respective participants will prob-
ably be expected to make contributions that are accordingly
higher or lower. She who wants a larger and more luxurious
house can have it if she is ready to contribute more to make up
for the higher production effort (measured, e.g., in weighted
hours) that goes into building and maintaining it.
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Similarly, while a peer project providing various foodstuffs
for its members might choose a flat rate model for many normal
foods (since nobody can eat that much more or less than
other people), it might use such a preference choice model for
more sumptuous or luxurious items such as whiskey or caviar.
In such a case, “normal” participants (who contribute just
as much as everybody else) might be able to choose freely
from among such “luxury goods” up to a certain amount;
while those who want more of them will be expected to make
accordingly higher contributions.
4.4.2.4 Preference Weighting (Product Auctioning)
Preference choice alone might not work in all cases. We already
mentioned the “sea view” example—a dwelling with sea view
won’t take a higher production effort than one without. Some
people might not care, but, when given the choice, more people
might prefer dwellings with sea view than available in any
seaside community (inland communities will have similar
problems in other areas). Customized production cannot help
here since coastlines cannot be extended at will.
One way to decide between such overlapping preferences
in a fair and non-arbitrary way is to introduce a preference
weighting (product auctioning) mechanism that is similar to
the weighted labor (task auctioning) model discussed above.
If there is more demand for any given product than can be
satisfied, a peer project can raise the relative cost (the amount
of required contributions) of this product until sufficiently
many of the prospective users get second thoughts (upward
auctioning). Conversely, if there is something available that
nobody wants to have, the project can make it more attractive
by lowering its relative costs (downward auctioning). Note that
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“product” here denotes anything that has been produced by a
project—this includes services just as well as material goods.
Of course, a peer project will generally try to accommo-
date its production to the existing internal demand as well as
possible; but whenever this is not possible (e.g., due to the
limited availability of “natural resources” such as sea view),
this preference weighting model can make up for it. As in the
case of the task auctioning system, such a product auctioning
mechanism can be conveniently designed as a computerized
system.
Note that it is the relative cost that is modified—if the rel-
ative cost (amount of contributions) for one specific item is
increased, the relative costs of all other items will automatically
fall. After all, the whole effort necessary to fulfill the goals of
a peer project is just distributed among its members—a project
needs to ensure that all tasks are picked up, but, beyond that,
“there is nothing left to do” (within the limits of the project),
so people can and will spend their remaining time and energy
in other ways.
Both the weighted labor model and this preference weight-
ing model ensure that everybody’s preferences have free play.
Nobody is forced to do a task they do not really want to do
or to live in conditions they don’t really like. You can freely
choose whether you prefer more luxury (and of which kinds)
or more laziness; whether you prefer spending more time do-
ing the things you want to do, or working for the things you
want to have, or whether you prefer living in a simple style or
doing some “quick-and-dirty” tasks so you can spend most of
your time in wholly other ways.
Of course, if you want luxury of all kinds and a life of
idleness that doesn’t involve any activities which are useful
to others, you might be out of luck—unless you can convince
others to provide everything for you. In general, you will have
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to make a decision that involves some kind of trade-off. But
this decision will be based on your own free choices; it won’t
be made for you by other people, nor by luck or fate (say,
based on lot, or the income or social position your parents
happen to have).
Figure 4.2 depicts the four different allocation models we
have covered.
4.4.2.5 Usage vs. Ownership
We have discussed the example of housing. Let’s take a look
at what the products of such a project will actually be. Will it
be the actual houses or apartments built by the project, to be
used by the respective inhabitants for as long as they want and
then to be disposed of in any way they choose? This might be
a possibility, but only if there is a market for people to get rid
of dwellings they no longer need. Otherwise people who only
need housing for a limited period of time would be put at a
serious disadvantage: they would have to contribute just as
much as if they wanted to live there “forever.”
Is there a way in which peer production can solve this
problem without having to rely on a complementary market
system? The answer is obvious when we remember the flat
rate model discussed above. With flat rates, a certain amount
of contributions is required for a given time of usage, say, a
month of Internet access. The same model can be used for
housing: contributions are required for living in a dwelling
for a certain amount of time, not for living there forever. For
each new month or year you stay there, you will have to make
additional contributions; if you no longer need the dwelling,
you will give it back to your local community (cf. Sec. 4.1—
housing might be managed most suitably by local communities
or associations, since houses are bound to a specific location).
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Figure 4.2: Effort sharing models for non-copyable goods
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The community will then give the dwelling to somebody else
willing to make the necessary contributions.
We can therefore expect housing in a peer production–based
economy to be more similar to renting than to buying a
dwelling in a market system; the main difference being that
there is no separate person or corporation you are renting it
from; instead, you get it from your own local community. The
produced dwellings can be considered a part of the commons—
they are commonly owned by the community, which makes
them available to its members on a for-use basis.
Again, there is no need that contributors and users are
actually identical. Somebody can inhabit a dwelling herself,
share it with her family and/or her friends, or just give it to
friends; this does not matter as long as she is willing to make
the necessary contributions.
Such an allocation system that is based on usage (possession)
instead of ownership (property) might be appropriate in other
situations as well. Whenever the expected “lifespan” of a
given product exceeds the expected time of usage by any
given person, a usage-based system seems reasonable, since
it avoids generating unnecessary garbage (still good things
being thrown away because the original user no longer needs
them) and does not depend on a secondary market for used
things.
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In the last chapter we discussed the issues that arise in regard
to the internal organization of any given peer project. Now we
are ready to turn from this internal view to the “big picture.”
A society based primarily on peer production would comprise
a multitude of such projects. How will they fit together? How
will they make decisions and how will they resolve conflicts?
How will they allocate resources? In short, how can we expect
such a peer economy to work?
5.1 Society as a Big Project or a Multitude of Projects
Considering the generalization of peer production from a
single peer project to a whole society, there are two comple-
mentary views of such a society we may take: Society can
be considered as a multitude of peer projects, each deciding on
its goals and its internal organizing. But society can also be
considered as a kind of big project (very big, indeed), where
mechanisms for sharing efforts and assigning produced goods
(such as discussed in the last chapter) are applied to society at
large.
We suppose that, to understand how the people living in
such a society will organize their lives, both these views have
some validity—neither of them would be sufficient in isolation,
but together they might give us a good picture. A society
based primarily on peer production will comprise a multitude
of projects; but between them, the people involved in these
projects are likely to establish some institutions that will make
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society itself—or some smaller or larger parts of it—resemble
a big project in some ways. In the following sections, we will
look at several reasons for such cooperation beyond projects,
and discuss the forms it may take.
5.2 Sharing Effort Between Projects: Distribution Pools
To understand a first aspect of where the “society as a big
project” view makes sense, we have to remember the problem
of how to coordinate the producer side of people with their
consumer side (discussed in Sec. 3.1). As consumers, people
generally have many diverse needs and desires. Having to
contribute to lots of different peer projects each specializing in
satisfying one or a few of them—one project for housing, other
ones for food, clothing, body care, electric gadgets, games
and toys, books and magazines, etc.—would clearly be very
impractical, if not infeasible.
But to organize a single project that produces lots of different
goods to satisfy all or most of the needs of its members (in
so far as they can be regarded as problems of production)
does not sound like a convincing solution either. Since a
project needs some decision-making structures to decide what
to produce and how to produce it, such a huge project might
become quite ponderous and bureaucratic. And since different
people have different needs, it would always produce goods
that some of its members don’t care about, while not producing
goods that other members would like to have.
Therefore people will probably prefer a middle way, with
different specialized projects all setting their goals and decid-
ing on their internal organization separately, but sharing tasks
and results as if they were a single huge project. They can do
so by using a single shared system for distributing both the tasks
they need to have handled and the results of their cooperation
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(the goods they have produced). Tasks and products can be
distributed in the same way as before—using task auctioning
(cf. Sec. 4.3.3) to assign tasks and allocation based on produc-
tion effort or preference weighting to distribute non-copyable
products (cf. Sec. 4.4.2)—but among all the participants of
such a distribution pool instead of just the members of a single
project.
This would allow everyone participating in a distribution
pool to benefit from results produced by any of the aggregated
projects. You do not have to work for lots of different projects
to get all the various things you need or like to have. As
long as there are projects producing the desired items in your
distribution pool, you only contribute your part of the required
effort to the pool, doing tasks of your choice for one or a few of
the participating projects until the amount of weighted labor
necessary for the products you desire has been reached (as
determined by the task and product auctioning system).
Organizing a joint task and product auctioning system for
a distribution pool will be slightly, but not essentially, more
complicated than organizing such a system for a single project.
One additional factor which might be irrelevant for single
projects is the location where tasks are to be performed. Since
people might be willing to do a certain task but unwilling to
move to a different place for doing so, it is quite likely that
some labor (working as a baker or as a medical doctor, say)
will be weighted higher in one town and lower in other places.
The project for which a task is to be handled is another factor
that will sometimes influence task popularity, since many
people will prefer working for projects with a high reputation
(cf. Sec. 2.3) and will shy away from projects whose reputation
is bad. Projects that are perceived as “doing the wrong thing,”
say, by treating their contributors badly, by producing goods
of dubious quality, or by engaging in activities that harm the
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environment, will tend to get negative reputation which will
make it more difficult for them to attract contributors.
Efforts spent for the production of goods that have to be
distributed via downward auctioning (cf. Sec. 4.4.2.4) probably
won’t be recognized fully, but only partially (proportional to
the downward auctioning), as contributions to a distribution
pool. Downward auctioning indicates that nobody considers
these goods “worth the effort.” If a pool would nevertheless
recognize the whole production effort, it would allow projects
to produce things that nobody wants and in return get access
to other goods, without having contributed anything useful by
themselves. Note that it will still be possible to acquire goods
for less effort than required (and recognized) for producing
them, since upward auctioning of some goods automatically
reduces the effort necessary to get all the others. (Cf. Sec. A.2
in the mathematical appendix for more on this problem and
its solution.)
The larger a distribution pool becomes, the better for the par-
ticipants, since any additional projects increase their choices,
both in regard to the tasks to perform and the produced items
to select from. Ideally, a single global distribution pool will
emerge, comprising all the projects that are interested in pool-
ing. Such a huge pool would not pose a risk of centralization
or of concentration of power, since the pool itself would only
be a passive piece of software. All the participating projects
would still decide for themselves what they produce and how
they organize their activities.
It is important to realize that for most people, contributions
will just take the form of doing some of the things they prefer
doing. No one will be forced to spend time with activities
they don’t like, aside from doing their chosen work, except in
the unusual case that none of the projects they prefer working
with should be ready to accept their contributions.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution pools
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the core ideas of the distribution pool
model.
5.3 Organizing Infrastructure and Public Services:
Local Associations
As stated before (Sec. 4.1), there are things that concern all
the people living in a specific area: the organization of in-
frastructure and of public services such as health care, child
and elder care, education, and protection and aid in case of
emergencies or trouble (emergency services, fire fighting, etc.).
This is another aspect for which the “multitude of projects”
view is insufficient. Without some coordination among the
concerned, the likely result would either be chaos (with the
activities of different projects conflicting with each other) or
else stagnation (with nobody providing such services since
everybody waits for others to make the necessary effort).
While any such activities can be handled by specific projects,
the people living in an area need to find a way of coordinating
them to avoid chaos. And to avoid stagnation, they will have
to share the required effort among themselves in a way that is
acceptable to all. They can do both by founding a local meta-
project that coordinates these issues and distributes the effort.
We use the term “meta-project” since it would not be neces-
sary to found a separate project that organizes infrastructure
and public services all by itself. Instead, there will probably
be various peer projects organizing different tasks (a project
building and maintaining streets and bridges, another one
running a hospital, a third organizing a fire brigade, etc.), and
it would be up to the meta-project to coordinate them and to
make sure that they all operate as expected.
Since the scales most suitable for organizing a task vary for
different tasks, we may assume that everybody will be not just
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a member of a single local meta-project (or local association), but
of several local meta-projects of different sizes that nest into
each other. We will explore this issue in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Which Services to Organize and How to Make Them
Available
A core issue which the members of such a local association will
have to decide is which services they choose to organize and
which of the various allocation models discussed in Section 4.4
they choose for making them available.
We wouldn’t be surprised if they will often decide to take a
comprehensive approach to the organization of infrastructure,
providing not only streets but also public transportation sys-
tems; not only access to water, electricity, and energy, but also
communication channels such as postal services, telephone
and Internet; sewage and garbage disposal will obviously be
necessary too. Granting access on a flat rate basis will prob-
ably be most suitable for many of these items; though local
associations might prefer accounting based on production effort
and preference weighting for some areas (say water or energy)
if wasteful usage turns out to be a problem or if they desire to
reduce usage due to its environmental impact.
For public services, flat rate allocation often seems a matter of
fairness. People don’t generally choose to become ill or frail, so
it would be unfair to expect them to contribute more because
of a choice they did not make. Actually, people who need care
because they are too old to care for themselves will generally
be unable to make up for it with any contributions, so flat rate
accounting is the only real option here.
Similarly, flat rate accounting seems most fair when it comes
to education and learning, especially for children. Quite likely,
children—similar to old people—won’t even be expected to
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contribute anything (cf. Sec. 8.1.1), so they themselves cannot
make up for it. There is little reason why it should be specifi-
cally the parents who have to contribute more to allow their
children to learn, and it would hardly be justifiable to prevent
children from learning if their parents are unwilling or unable
to make up for it.
We suppose that local associations will tend to consider the
acquisition of knowledge or skills as a contribution, sparing
learners the necessity to contribute to the local meta-project in
other ways, at least to a certain degree. Since communities and
regions benefit if their inhabitants can handle a wide variety
of tasks in a skillful way, it only makes sense for them to
encourage people to broaden their horizon and improve their
skills.
Organization of housing is another issue that is best handled
at the local level, as mentioned above (Sec. 4.4.2.5). We suppose
that customized production and preference weighting will be
the most appropriate models here.
Of course, the people living in a specific area will never
be limited to the offerings coordinated by their local meta-
projects—they can always join or organize independent peer
projects to provide alternatives.
5.3.2 Levels of Local Cooperation
5.3.2.1 Communal Meta-Projects (Local Communities)
How many people might join forces in such local associations?
People will find out suitable sizes by themselves, but we can
already make some conjectures.
While (as stated above) we wouldn’t be surprised if distri-
bution pools become very large, we don’t think the same will
happen with local meta-projects. Since the local situation will
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be somewhat different from area to area, smaller meta-projects
will be able to cope more flexibly with their local situation.
Also, local meta-projects will need to make decisions about
which services to provide and how to organize them; and the
larger a meta-project is, the smaller the role of each individual
member in the decision-making processes becomes. In a meta-
project with millions of members, people might feel as if they
“don’t matter” for the workings of the project and as if they
have little chance to influence its decisions.
On the other hand, meta-projects that are too small will have
problems coordinating all the tasks they want to handle—the
various activities outlined above will need a high degree of
division of labor and specialization to fill all the required roles.
Also, many activities will be difficult or inefficient to organize
if there aren’t enough potential “customers” (e.g., health care
beyond the most basic level). For these reasons we suppose
that meta-projects of a few 10,000 people (or less) would not
run quite smoothly—they might be better off if they unite with
others to form a larger group.
Local communities (or peer communities) of about 100,000 to
500,000 people might be of a better size to organize a local
meta-project—neither too small to flexibly organize manifold
tasks, nor too large to stay in tune with the daily lives of their
members. Thus the people living in a medium-sized town, or
a quarter of a larger city, or a group of villages or small towns,
could cooperate to organize a communal meta-project.
5.3.2.2 Large-scale Cooperation at the Regional Level and
Beyond
Resources such as electricity can often be most efficiently pro-
duced on a large scale. And there are physical items of which
each local community will only need a few, say, trams or buses
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for their public transportation system, construction machinery
for building streets and houses, or specialized equipment, for
example for hospitals.
We can expect local communities to cooperate with adjacent
communities to handle efforts that require coordination be-
yond the communal level, organizing in a regional meta-project
such tasks and services that cannot efficiently be organized
at the communal level. Regions (or peer regions) comprising
about 30 to 50 local communities might be of a good size
for such purposes—they would be large enough (about 3 to
15 million people) to address most efforts for which a single
community is too small, and yet small enough to ensure that
all the involved communities and their members have a say in
the decisions regarding the regional level.
Such cooperation is especially reasonable for the organi-
zation of transport systems between communities and for
other large-scale infrastructure projects. Groups of neighbor-
ing communities will also tend to cooperate in regard to the
building and running of universities and research institutes,
opera houses and museums, specialized medical centers, and
other institutions that would strain the capacities of a single
community.
We suppose that such regions of several million people will
be large enough for most purposes. If and when they are not,
regions can cooperate with other regions at the superregional
level, in a similar way to local communities cooperating at the
regional level. Finally, such large superregions (which might
comprise about 30 to 50 regions with 150 to 500 million inhab-
itants, assuming a similar jump in scale) can cooperate with
each other at the global level. Global cooperation might make
sense for the organization of very large research activities such
as space exploration or particle physics.
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5.3.2.3 Small-scale Cooperation and Neighborhoods
Structures that are far smaller than a single local community
will continue to matter as well. Many people will live in
households with friends or family, like today. Groups of house-
holds might pool together their use of resources that each of
them needs occasionally but not all the time, such as wash-
ing machines, specialized kitchen equipment, or toolboxes;
and they might help each other regarding the organization of
day-to-day activities such as child care. Such kinds of sharing
and cooperation are nothing new, but they will probably be
more frequent and commonplace in a peer economy, which is
centered around possession and cooperation, than in a market-
based economy, which is based on private property and on
buying and selling.
Of course, there is no reason to suppose that shared usage
will be obligatory. People will be free to decide whether
they prefer the shared usage of an item (such as a washing
machine) or whether they prefer to have their own. Either
decision will have some advantages and some disadvantages—
sharing something will require some coordination and you
might sometimes have to wait until it becomes available, but
using your own will require a higher effort to get and to
maintain it, and you might need additional room for storage.
In addition to and beyond such small-scale cooperation
which will probably be largely ad hoc, people might estab-
lish commons centers to facilitate sharing and cooperation on
a somewhat larger and more organized scale, say among five
hundred to a few thousand people (a neighborhood, or peer
neighborhood). Such a commons center could comprise special-
ized equipment and tools, a car pool, a small library, and a
party room, and whatever else people prefer to share. It could
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also serve as a meeting point and as organizational basis for
the shared handling of day-to-day activities.
Figure 5.2 resumes the approximate scales and main pur-
poses of the various levels of local associations proposed in
this model.
5.3.3 Ensuring That Tasks Are Handled
The people living together in a local association will not only
have to decide which kinds of infrastructure and public ser-
vices they want to organize, but they will also need ways of
distributing the necessary tasks among themselves. The most
flexible way of doing so is by participating with the respective
local meta-project in a distribution pool (cf. Sec. 5.2). Due to the
effort-balancing effect of distribution pools, this means that
the members of a local association will have to contribute as
much effort to the pool as they take out of it: together, they
need to contribute enough weighted labor to the distribution
pool to make up for the overall effort required for the activities
coordinated by their local meta-project. But since distribution
pools use a shared task auctioning system for all participating
projects, they can do this by contributing to any project in the
pool—they do not necessarily have to contribute to projects
coordinated by the local meta-project.
For infrastructure and public services made available on
a flat-rate basis, this means that the required effort will be
distributed evenly among everyone who benefits, i.e., among
all the inhabitants of the respective local association (except
those who are exempted, cf. Sec. 8.1.1). For example, if the
tasks a local community decides to organize on a flat-rate
basis take one million weighted hours a week and there are
200,000 contributing members, each community member will
have to contribute five weekly hours of weighted labor to the
distribution pool (to any project or projects of their choice).
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Figure 5.2: Sizes and purposes of local associations
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While participation in other peer projects is by choice, par-
ticipation in local meta-projects will probably be automatic.
By moving in any given area you agree that you are willing to
take your part in contributing to the effort it takes to organize
infrastructure and public services that your local association
decides to handle on a flat-rate basis since they potentially
concern all or most people. At least this seems to be a rea-
sonable assumption, since the alternative—that people decide
for themselves whether they want to have health care and
protection from calamities such as fires etc.—doesn’t fly. It
would mean that if you suffer an accident or a severe illness or
if your house burns down, the others either will have to stand
by without helping or they will have to help without getting
anything in return. The first option is hardly conceivable,
which means that you cannot really opt out from using such
services.
Thus, expecting everyone to take their share in organizing
them seems just fair: since opting out from using such public
services is not feasible, we suppose that opting out from orga-
nizing them won’t be feasible either. The same holds for the
organization of at least some kinds of infrastructure: everyone
will like to use the streets now and then, everyone will benefit
from having access to water and electricity and from having
working sewage and garbage disposal systems.
Remember that this does not mean that anybody will be
forced to participate in any specific activity; most people will
contribute their share in weighted hours by doing one of their
preferred activities.
5.4 Coordinating Production: Prosumer Associations
A third aspect in which we expect the free cooperation char-
acteristic for peer production (cf. Sec. 2.2) to transcend the
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limits of a single project concerns the coordination of produc-
tion and the sharing of experiences and knowledge among
projects active in the same sector of production. If we regard
local associations as coordinating production processes verti-
cally among people and projects from a specific area, we can
consider such cooperation between projects active in the same
sector of production as horizontal coordination. We will use the
term prosumer association to refer to any institutions (formal or
informal) facilitating such horizontal coordination among the
people and projects involved as producers or consumers (or
both) in a specific sector of production.
We will now investigate several forms which such coordina-
tion may take, discussing for each form whether and why it is
likely to occur.
5.4.1 Adjusting Supply to Demand
An important goal that projects can reach by coordinating
their activities is to better adjust supply to demand, by projects
coordinating which and how many goods they produce. This
only affects projects that address the same set of consumers,
say projects distributing their products in the same distribution
pool.
From the viewpoint of producing projects, the main risk
that can be reduced by such coordination is overproduction: if
they don’t coordinate their production, they risk producing
more goods than consumers want to have. For producers, the
risk here is wasted effort: if they produce a good that nobody
wants to have, the effort they spent producing it will have
been totally wasted; if they only manage to distribute a good
via downward auctioning, the effort will only be recognized in
part (cf. the remark in Sec. 5.2 regarding downward auctioning
in distribution pools). In either case, they would have been
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better off spending their time for producing something which
is actually needed (either by themselves or by somebody else).
For producers, it clearly makes sense to coordinate their activi-
ties with other projects working on similar goods, since they
cannot be sure in advance whether it would be them or others
whose effort will have been wasted if they produce too much
(if all their products are of comparable quality, the likely result
is that they will all be distributed via downward auctioning,
so all the projects would suffer).
For the consumer side, underproduction is the more serious
risk. In many cases, underproduction will be easily noticeable
by products being distributed via upward auctioning, i.e., for
more effort than necessary for producing them (cf. Sec. 4.4.2.4);
additionally, prosumer associations can also keep wish lists to
collect “feature requests” for products and features that are not
yet produced. These indicators will give people and projects
looking for worthwhile tasks hints about where to start.
In a peer economy, there is at least no risk of dedicated
underproduction. Market producers might and will produce
less than they could if this allows them to increase their profits
by getting higher prices. Peer producers, on the other hand,
don’t benefit from higher prices, since peer production is based
on effort sharing, not on profits. If some goods are distributed
via upward auctioning due to insufficient supply, the only effect
is that all the other goods distributed in the same pool become
slightly cheaper, since the overall production effort is now
distributed in a different way—the producers themselves won’t
benefit any more than everybody else participating in the pool.
Producers won’t benefit from underproduction, but it does
not really hurt them either. Therefore, prosumer associations
might be less successful at avoiding underproduction than
at avoiding overproduction. Unless you do it yourself, there
is certainly no guarantee that anybody will start to produce
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a certain good, just because you would like to have it (and
consider it worth the effort).
Still, the coordination in prosumer associations will help
against underproduction too: in many cases, the people active
in a project will like to expand their production, if they can be
reasonably sure that their additional effort won’t be wasted.
One reason for this is that people who spend only part of
their effort in a project might like to spend more or all of
their production activities there if they enjoy the tasks they are
doing within the project more than the tasks they are doing
outside. Another is the psychological satisfaction of knowing
that you do something that is useful to others, which is more
obviously the case when you cater for needs that so far have
not or not sufficiently been addressed.
Moreover, many producers will also be consumers (“pro-
sumers”) and as such they will be affected if underproduction
leads to upward auctioning and hence higher prices of the
goods they produce and consume. (Of course, they might also
decide to produce just for themselves instead of taking part
in a distribution pool, but such a decision would have other
disadvantages: they would still have to contribute in other
ways to a distribution pool to get access to goods produced by
others; and production for a smaller group of people would
probably be less efficient, leading to a similar rise in required
effort as the upward auctioning.)
Note that such adjustment of supply to demand won’t in-
volve much planning overhead—much of it will occur sponta-
neously, by the individual decisions of projects that want to
avoid wasting effort, and by the choices of people and projects
looking for suitable new tasks to pick up. Still, some commu-
nications and agreements in prosumer associations will help
people to reduce their risk of mistakes, and therefore will take
place.
57
5 Fitting It All Together: A Peer Economy
5.4.2 Optimizing Production
Another important effect of horizontal coordination can be the
optimization of production techniques. By sharing their knowl-
edge and experiences, including new techniques and inven-
tions, projects can help each other to produce the same goods
with less effort than before, or to produce goods that are bet-
ter (from the point of view of the consumer) as before with
the same effort. This would benefit those producers that are
currently producing less efficient than others, but primarily it
would benefit consumers, since it reduces the average effort
they have to spend to get the goods they like.
Why should projects share their knowledge and insight with
others? There are cases where the answer is clear: projects that
are mainly producing for their own contributors (producers =
consumers), or projects that are active for different local meta-
projects, will clearly benefit by learning from the experiences of
others, while they won’t suffer a disadvantage by sharing their
own experiences. However, if several projects are producing
similar goods within the same distribution pool, addressing
the same set of potential consumers, they have an incentive for
secrecy: all else being equal, consumers will usually prefer the
goods that take them less effort to get, so by producing more
efficiently a project can extend its own production at the cost
of the other projects.
Yet, this incentive for secrecy is far less strong than in a
market economy, where increasing your market share is often
a good way of increasing your profit rate. In peer production,
there is no such effect. Since peer production is based on effort
sharing, the result of attracting more consumers is merely
that your project can contribute additional effort into a pool
(the current project members can either work longer or accept
additional members into the project). For the project members,
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this is not a large benefit: a mere increase in the number of
members will hardly make participation in a project more
pleasant than before. A member might prefer if she personally
can contribute the effort required to get the goods she likes
to have in the context of a single project instead of spreading
it over several ones, but, except for very small projects, this
should be possible in any case.
Hence, project members have little reason to prefer secrecy.
On the other hand, they have various reasons to avoid secrecy:
1. Sharing will be good for your reputation (and also psy-
chologically rewarding in itself), while secrecy will be
bad. From the viewpoint of consumers, it is clearly ad-
vantageous if the projects producing the goods they want
share their knowledge to optimize their production ef-
forts. If you don’t, you are clearly “doing the wrong
thing” (cf. Sec. 2.3), and your potential consumers will
not like it. They might well react by “shunning” your
products (instead choosing those of projects that “share
nicely”), either with the express purpose of “teaching
you a lesson” or just instinctively.
But your loss of reputation might not just drive con-
sumers away, it will also make your project less attractive
for potential contributors (whose own reputation depends
in part on the projects they are in). This would cause the
weight of tasks you distribute via task auctioning to go
up (cf. Sec. 4.3.3), so your production effort (as measured
in weighted hours) will actually increase, counteracting
your attempt to keep it low.
2. In the long run, many cooperating projects will generally
be more successful than a single non-cooperating one.
If you refuse to share with others, they will probably
respond by refusing to share with you, making it much
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harder for to you keep up with whatever new inventions
and insights they come up with.
3. Innovation will tend to spread anyway: attempts of keep-
ing your innovations and optimizations secret will hardly
be successful for very long. Sooner or later, others will
find out what you did, either by reverse engineering your
products or from people who have left your project or
don’t feel bound by your desire for secrecy. In capitalism,
there are often laws that prohibit or restrict such “wild”
innovation spreading, but in a peer economy people will
hardly adopt or enact such laws, since in the context of
peer production they don’t fulfill any useful purpose.
We suppose that these incentives to prefer sharing over
secrecy will typically prove to be stronger than the incentive
for secrecy. More importantly, they will tend to make those
who share more successful than those who don’t. If this
doesn’t convince the latter to change their ways, they might
well find themselves being left behind and becoming marginal.
5.4.3 Defining Standards and Guidelines
Another activity that prosumer associations might choose to
handle is the definition of standards that improve interoperabil-
ity between products, components, and accessories produced
by different projects, thus facilitating future repairs and re-
placements, or that ensure that products are accessible to all
kinds of people. Consumers will usually prefer projects who
adhere to such standards (provided they are reasonable) so
they won’t become dependent on a single project for future
upgrades or repairs of the things they are using. Projects
following standards will thus generally be more successful.
Projects planning to do so will have good reason to partake in
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the shaping of standards so they can influence the outcome
and won’t be surprised by it.
In addition to standards characterizing properties of the
produced goods, prosumer associations might also publish
guidelines on how to produce them. Guidelines might de-
scribe recommended practices and specify which activities
and practices are considered unacceptable (e.g., because they
are considered dangerous for the participants or for other peo-
ple, harmful to the environment, or discriminating against
specific groups of people).
Such guidelines might be less relevant for consumers, but
they will influence the decisions of potential contributors. Pro-
vided the guidelines are reasonable, violating them will either
mean that the working conditions of contributors become less
agreeable or less safe or that their reputation is put at risk
(your reputation will suffer if you are known to be in a project
that “does the wrong thing,” say by endangering the environ-
ment). Additionally, a prosumer association might decide to
make adherence to standards and guidelines a precondition
for full participation in the association.
Horizontal cooperation between projects active in the same
sector of production will hardly be limited to the three forms
we have discussed. Some other forms of such cooperation will
be mentioned later throughout the text.
Also, there is no strict reason for these different forms of
horizontal cooperation to be handled by a single association
instead of by different institutions for different tasks (for ex-
ample, standardization might be handled by a separate orga-
nization). We just use the umbrella term prosumer associations
to refer to any such institutions that projects might set up to
handle horizontal coordination tasks, regardless of the exact
form they take.
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5.5 Resource Allocation
Peer projects and local associations will often need natural
resources for producing what they want. How to manage and
allocate such resources?
5.5.1 Demand and Availability
Resource allocation only becomes a problem when the demand
surpasses the availability—as long as there is enough of a re-
source available for everybody who wants to use it, there is no
problem. Demand is established automatically by the summed
decisions of all people and projects about what they want to
consume or produce and which resources they need to do so.
Availability, however, is trickier to determine—if the whole
amount of a non-renewable resource were considered to be
available right now, it might soon be all used up, leaving
nothing available for future generations. And for renewable
resources, there often is a difference between using them and
using them up. Land can potentially be used forever for pur-
poses such as agriculture or farming, when used in a sensible
way; but when used irresponsibly, the soil might be destroyed
and the land will cease to be available, at least for some time.
Determining availability thus requires some decisions. Re-
garding non-renewable resources it must be decided how long
they should last, i.e., which amount of them can be made
available each year. Regarding renewable resources it must
be decided whether they are available for using up (which is
probably not a good idea, but might be necessary in some
cases) or just for using. A third, and general, decision is which
resources not to consider available for production at all, but
to retain as they are (say if they are sacred places according
to local tradition) or to use for other purposes (say as a wild
forest or as a public park).
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5.5.2 Local Management and Pooled Usage
Any specific resource is bound to the location where it occurs.
Thus it makes sense to assume that the respective local associ-
ations (cf. Sec. 5.3) will have a say in making these decisions
regarding availability. Note, however, that this does not mean
that the local associations will own the resources—ownership,
whether by communities or other institutions or by private
persons, requires a market where you can buy resources that
you need but don’t own, and sell resources that you own
but don’t need. This is the same problem we discussed for
housing (Sec. 4.4.2.5): ownership of resources would mean
that this aspect of the economy falls outside the realm of peer
production, and a complementary market economy is needed
to handle it. The alternative, as in the case of housing, consists
in considering resources to be part of the commons. They can
be managed by the local associations they are in, but they are
not owned by anybody.
Management of resources implies decisions about which
resources to consider available (as discussed above) and how
to share them. The problem of sharing resources is similar to
the problem of sharing those results of a project that cannot be
freely copied (cf. Sec. 4.4.2), which suggests that at least some
of the possible solutions should also be similar.
Indeed, when the availability is higher than the demand,
sharing is trivial: everybody can get what they want, which is
essentially a flat rate model. If there is more demand than can
be satisfied, preference weighting, i.e., the auctioning of available
resources, is probably the most suitable model. Flat allocation
would not make much sense since generally people would
either get more of a resource than they can use or less than
they need and nobody would be happy; accounting based on
production effort isn’t possible since natural resources are not
produced by human labor.
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But among whom are the available resources to be shared?
If resources are considered as commons, it is clear that they do
not belong to any specific group of people: ideally, they are
shared among everybody, among mankind.
Above we had first discussed how the members of a single
project can distribute their results among themselves (Sec.
4.4.2), but later observed that the participants of various proj-
ects will benefit if they join all their task and result allocation
systems into a single system instead of using separate ones
(the distribution pool model proposed in Sec. 5.2). The same
argument applies for resources as well: the members of various
local communities and regions will benefit if they pool their
available resources, using the shared allocation system of an
existing distribution pool to distribute the available resources of
all participating local associations among all their inhabitants.
Thus, resources will be allocated through the chosen distri-
bution pool in addition to tasks and products—though not
everyone, but only inhabitants of the pooling local associations
will be eligible to get these resources. If the availability of
a resource is insufficient to satisfy the demands of all inter-
ested inhabitants on a flat-rate basis (i.e., for free), it will be
auctioned among them: the resource will be assigned to the
people willing to contribute most weighted labor to the pool
in order to get it.
In this way, the resources of all participating local associ-
ations are available to all their inhabitants (and the projects
they take part in), and the price (in weighted labor, as deter-
mined by the auctioning system) of a resource that cannot be
shared on a flat-rate basis will be the same for all. If a project
acquires resources that are not available for free (flat rate), it
can add the weighted labor necessary to get them to the tasks
the project members need to handle, so this additional labor
will be distributed among them in the usual way.
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5.5.3 Distributing Resources Through a Distribution Pool
A sufficiently large distribution pool avoids the problem that,
without recurring to a market, resources that only occur in
certain areas would not be available to the inhabitants of
other areas at all, and resources that are rare in any given
area would draw very high prices due to over-demand. Even
communities and regions where natural resources of some
kind are plentiful will generally benefit from participation in
a distribution pool, since any local association is unlikely to
have enough of all the resources its members need. Moreover,
once resource distribution through distribution pools becomes
usual, local associations will become expected to share them.
Local associations that share their resources will hardly be
willing to cooperate with others that don’t. Therefore, local
associations that try to treat resources as their property instead
of as commons will find themselves not only without access
to resources that do not occur in their area, but also without
the cooperation partners they need to accomplish large-scale
efforts.
We stated above (Sec. 5.2) that the emergence of a single
global distribution pool instead of various smaller ones would
be the best scenario. This is even more relevant for the dis-
tribution of resources than for the distribution of tasks and
products, since only resource access through the same pool
will ensure that everyone has fair access to any resources with-
out being put at an advantage or disadvantage by the area they
happen to live in. In fact, it is quite likely that such a single
huge pool will emerge, since the members of peer projects
and local associations will tend to join the largest pool which
gives them the most variety of tasks, products, and resources
to choose from.
Remember that resources are considered as commons, not as
the property of the local associations where they occur. They
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are just made available as additional goods to be distributed in
a pool. A high price paid for a resource won’t go back to the
association of origin; it just means that all the other available
goods become slightly cheaper. This follows from the fact that
resources are treated just like other goods that are distributed
through the pool: if a project successfully distributes one of
its products through the pool, the effort (in weighted labor)
required to produce it will be recognized as a contribution to
the pool. But natural resources are not produced, they just
exist, so the production effort to be recognized is zero.
Of course, the usage of resources often involves effort, but
any efforts necessary for getting and utilizing resources will
be up to those who use them—what is pooled is only the right
to use a resource. In practice, there will often be specialized
projects for obtaining and transporting resources, and most
acquirers of resources will probably entrust such tasks to one
of them (recognizing their effort in the usual way) instead of
handling the resources directly.
Since resources are commons, the right to use a resource
probably won’t include the right to sell it. People and projects
who get resources on a flat-rate or auctioning basis will be
able to use them for their own activities, but they will hardly
be allowed to sell them or to use them for the production of
goods that are meant to be sold; otherwise, especially flat-
rate access would quickly break down. Of course, such a
provision to keep the commons common (i.e., not to turn them
into property), which resembles the copyleft clause of the GNU
General Public License (cf. Sec. 4.4.1), will only be relevant as
long as a peer production–based economy and a market-based
economy co-exist.
If resources are considered as commons that are distributed
through a distribution pool, decisions regarding resource avail-
ability become quite sensitive, because they shape the extent
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of the commons. This is one aspect of decision making in a
peer economy—an issue to which we will turn next.
5.6 Decision Making
Studies such as Schweik and English (2007) show that cur-
rent peer projects tend to favor institutions and processes
for decision making and conflict resolution that are lean and
unobtrusive. And we had already stated (in Sec. 2.2) that
peer production lacks the elements of coercion that are typ-
ical for other systems of production. We may expect that
future peer institutions and processes will be similarly lean
and non-coercive.
There are mainly two purposes which peer institutions have
to fulfill: they need to organize shared production and they
need to deal with conflicts between members if the people
concerned fail to resolve them by themselves. Current insti-
tutions (such as states) often pursue additional goals, trying
to regulate people’s lives far beyond what is necessary for the
purposes of organizing production and resolving conflicts. As
far as we can see, such tendencies of controlling people’s lives
are absent from current peer projects, and we see no reasons
why they should re-appear in the future.
5.6.1 Aspects of Decision Making
In the context of peer production, two aspects of decision mak-
ing can be observed: the meritocratic aspect and the democratic
aspect.
In current peer projects, it is often a single person or a
small number of persons that have ultimate decision-making
power. In many free software projects (especially in smaller
ones) there is a single maintainer (lead developer) who decides
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which contributions to accept and which features to add and
who is responsible for resolving any disputed issues regarding
the architecture and design of the software. In larger projects,
there are often some domain specialists responsible for main-
taining and managing certain components or aspects of the
system (sub-maintainers); sometimes a core team of several per-
sons jointly fills the maintainer role. People tend to get such
positions based on their initiative (e.g., as project founder) or
because of their (perceived) capabilities and expertise, hence
free software projects are often described as meritocratic (cf.
Schweik and English, 2007; Lehmann, 2004).
The individuals trusted with such roles are generally ex-
pected to “do the right thing” instead of just making arbitrary
decisions according to their personal preferences. The (per-
ceived) ability to “do the right thing,” to decide in the way
that makes most sense from a technological or social point of
view and that is likely to be best for the project, has a strong
positive influence on people’s reputation and on their chances
of being accepted for and successful in such roles (cf. Sec. 2.3).
In current peer projects, the democratic aspect mainly comes
in two forms:
• People “vote with their feet,” supporting the projects
they like, and leaving or forking a project if they are
unhappy about the way in which it evolves.
• Project participants generally strive for consensus or, at
least, rough consensus, resorting to maintainer decisions
only in those rare cases where rough consensus fails to
emerge.
The concept of rough consensus has first become popular
through its usage in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
which explains it as follows:
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Working groups make decisions through a “rough
consensus” process. IETF consensus does not re-
quire that all participants agree although this is, of
course, preferred. In general, the dominant view of
the working group shall prevail. (However, it must
be noted that “dominance” is not to be determined
on the basis of volume or persistence, but rather
a more general sense of agreement.) (IETF, 1998,
Sec. 3.3)
Majority voting is seldom used in current peer projects. The
open character of many projects makes it hard to clearly and
fairly determine who is and who isn’t sufficiently involved to
be eligible to vote. Also, most current projects communicate
primarily over the Internet, which would make it very hard
to prevent people from assuming additional identities (called
“sock puppets” in the Wikipedia community) and voting sev-
eral times. A further reason for majority votes being rare is
the stability of projects: a project deciding on a controversial
issue with a narrow majority would risk losing a large part of
its participants, since those unhappy about the decision can
always leave the project, possibly forking it by founding their
own alternative project.
The “enforcement” of rules and decisions is often based on
technical means (somebody without write access to the code
repository cannot damage the source code of a project) as well
as on trust; most projects manage to do quite well without for-
mal control and sanction mechanisms. If people accidentally
or (quite seldom) intentionally violate the rules, they are usu-
ally just told that they did wrong and admonished not to do
so again; mostly this happens in a friendly fashion, but more
aggressive and scolding “flames” occur as well, especially in
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more serious cases (cf. Schweik and English, 2007). Due to the
important role of reputation, trying to give somebody negative
reputation by “flaming and shunning” them tends to be a
powerful way of sanctioning people if less aggressive ways
prove ineffectual. If all else fails, boycott and exclusion remain
as the toughest sanctioning mechanisms: the concerned per-
son might be removed from communication channels (such as
mailing lists), she will lose her rights of making contributions
to the project (losing repository write access if she had any),
and she will generally be boycotted and ignored (cf. Lehmann,
2004).
5.6.2 Decision Making in Peer Projects
We suppose that future peer projects will pursue similar ways
of decision making as the current ones, striving for rough con-
sensus and trusting maintainers and other responsible experts
to “do the right thing,” especially in regard to technical issues.
One difference to the current situation is that we would not
be surprised if projects that require contributions will rely more
heavily on democratic decisions, including majority voting (at
least as fallback mechanism) than current projects, which are
generally based on voluntarism (cf. Sec. 4.2). In such projects,
the problem of deciding who is eligible to vote and to prevent
duplicate votes becomes void since voting rights can be tied
to contributions; and when people have to make a certain
amount of contributions, it seems reasonable to assume that
they will want to have more say in regard to the activities of
the projects.
However, the concern that narrow majority votes would
endanger the stability of projects still applies. Thus, even
projects that require contributions will probably strive for
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rough consensus whenever possible, falling back to majority
voting only as a last resort when consensus cannot be reached.
Another way of ensuring the influence of contributors while
keeping the meritocratic character of peer projects would be
to assign revocable positions for maintainers, sub-maintainers
and other special roles. This would mean that the chosen
persons can make the decisions they deem appropriate; but
when the project members are dissatisfied with the decisions
of a specialist, they can revoke her (possibly canceling her last
decisions) and appoint a new person for her role.
5.6.3 Decision Making in Local Associations
5.6.3.1 Organization of Local Meta-Projects
Since the primary purpose of local associations in a peer econ-
omy is the providing of infrastructure and public services (cf.
Sec. 5.3), a major part of local decision making will regard the
coordination of these activities in local meta-projects. We may
expect that their ways of decision making will be comparable
to those of regular peer projects, comprising both meritocratic
and democratic aspects.
We would not be surprised if people will prefer the demo-
cratic mode for decisions regarding which kinds of infrastruc-
ture and public services to organize and how to make them
available (cf. Sec. 5.3.1); but the meritocratic mode for decisions
about how these activities are organized, trusting detail deci-
sions to the projects and persons actually handling a specific
task. This would give all the inhabitants of a local association
a say in regard to which infrastructures and services they will
get, while leaving the details of providing these services to the
experts doing the actual work.
However, this trust will probably not be unconditional—
more likely, local associations will reserve some rights of
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democratic override for themselves, allowing their members to
question and if necessary cancel any detail decisions they are
unhappy about (possibly requiring a supermajority of, for
example, 60% for such override decisions). The people and
projects doing the actual work will then have to decide whether
they can go along with the democratic decision; if not, the
local association will no longer recognize their activities as
contributions to the meta-project. In that case they would have
to look for other tasks to do for the local association, while the
association would need to find other people taking over their
work.
While we stated above that peer projects tend to aim for
rough consensus when making democratic decisions, we doubt
that this will be the preferred mode for deciding which in-
frastructures and public services to provide—there is no good
reason not to organize any specific service just because 5% or
10% of the people don’t think it necessary. Instead, simple ma-
jority voting or even quorum voting (a task will be organized
if a quorum of, say, at least 25% of all voters deem it useful)
makes more sense for such decisions. It also seems reasonable
to accept stakeholder-specific decisions regarding the concerns
of specific groups of people—for example, questions regarding
education and child care mainly concern children and their
parents, so it seems reasonable to consider a majority or quo-
rum of their votes to be sufficient for decisions regarding these
questions.
5.6.3.2 Resource Availability
Another kind of decisions the people living in an area will have
to make concern the availability of resources occurring in their
area (cf. Sec. 5.5). If resources are pooled as commons, such
decisions regarding availability become quite sensitive. They
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affect not just the specific local association where a resource
occurs, but also all the other local associations pooling their
resources. If all local association were to make their decisions
independently from each other and one of them decides to
keep back many of its resources, the other ones might get the
impression that it wants to benefit from their resources but is
not willing to give back. The likely result is that other local
associations would react by sharing less of their own resources,
which might well cause the whole resource pooling system to
break down.
The local associations participating in a pool thus need to
find a way of conciliating the concerns of the people living in a
specific area with the concerns of all the other people pooling
their resources. One way of doing this it to set up a bottom-up
mechanism for making availability decisions.
We already pointed out that there will be several levels of
local associations (cf. Sec. 5.3.2). Bottom-up decisions could
start at a comparatively localized level, say the level of local
communities. Each local community makes proposals regard-
ing the availability of resources occurring in its area and passes
these proposals to the next-highest level (regions). Each region
merges the proposals from the local communities into an in-
tegrated proposal which is passed to the next (superregional)
level; and so on (after the superregional, there may be a global
level, if various superregions share their resources in the same
pool).
The decisions of each larger local association would be made
by a board of delegates from the smaller associations constitut-
ing it; the board would make its proposal based on—but not
strictly bound by—the proposals of the smaller associations (cf.
Sec. 7.1.2 for more on the organization of such decision-making
structures). In this way, nobody needs to fear that decisions
regarding locally available resources are made by some remote
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agency which has little clue about the local situation; but nei-
ther can some of the participating local associations arbitrarily
withhold resources while benefiting from those of others.
5.6.4 Decision Making in Prosumer Associations
Since prosumer associations (Sec. 5.4) are just “meta-projects”
that don’t produce or organize anything on their own, there
won’t be that many day-to-day decisions to be made. Most
decisions will concern the coordination of production to better
adjust supply to demand (cf. Sec. 5.4.1) and the definition of
standards and guidelines (cf. Sec. 5.4.3). The third activity of
prosumer associations we had discussed—the sharing of expe-
riences and knowledge to optimize production (cf. Sec. 5.4.2)—
will mainly be informal without requiring decisions.
We assume that these decisions will typically require a rough
consensus or at least a strong majority among the involved
projects. Rough consensus is already the typical mode of
decision making in standards organization such as the IETF
(quoted above) or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
And since prosumer associations cannot force projects to pro-
duce or not to produce something, (rough) consensus among
the concerned projects is the only realistic option to ensure
that the decisions of the association on how to handle supply
are implemented as agreed.
This does not necessarily mean that the horizontal coordi-
nation between projects in the same sector would come to a
halt if there are some projects that refuse to become part of a
rough consensus. In such cases it is always possible for the
remaining projects to make agreements (how to adjust supply
or which standards and guidelines to follow) among them-
selves. Such a limited consensus would be less satisfactory
than a consensus among all relevant projects, but it would
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still offer practical advantages for the participating projects
(for supply coordination, they can decide to share the risk of
overproduction among themselves, thus mitigating the indi-
vidual risk of any project; consumers and contributors will
tend to prefer projects adhering to prevalent standards and
responsible guidelines over those that don’t). The possible
effects on reputation are another factor promoting consensus
building: projects that block decisions will have to be careful
to give good reasons for their behavior, otherwise they risk
being perceived as irresponsible which wouldn’t help their
reputation.
How to organize decision making in practice? One way of
doing so would be to set up a coordination board comprising
one delegate for each participating project. If a prosumer
association becomes too large for delegates of all projects to
be present in a single board, they could introduce an interim
level by grouping the participating projects by location and/or
by more specialized activity domains, and establish a specific
coordination board for each group of projects. Each of these
specific coordination boards would then choose a delegate to
send to the main coordination board; domain-specific coordi-
nation boards could also directly decide on any agreements,
standards, and guidelines concerning their specific domain of
activity.
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6 Comparison with Other Modes of Production
We now know enough about how an economy based on peer
production might work to be able to compare it with alterna-
tive modes of production.
6.1 Differences from a Market Economy
Today, the globally dominant economy is clearly the market-
based mode of production, also known as capitalism. Due to
the important role of auctioning, which is also employed in
market-based production, the proposed model might appear
to be similar to the market. Indeed, the usage of auctioning has
effects that are similar to some effects of the market, since both
remove the need for hierarchical planning and/or extensive
discussions that would otherwise be necessary to distribute
tasks, products, and resources. Nevertheless, the differences
are striking.
6.1.1 No More Indirection
The fundamental difference—the one difference that causes all
the others—is that the peer economy directly achieves the goal
which the market achieves only indirectly (if at all): fulfilling
people’s needs and desires, making it possible for them to get
what they want to have and to live the way they want to live.
In the peer economy, you cooperate with others to get the
goods you like to have, while in the market economy you
produce one thing to get money which then allows you to get
other things.
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Peer production cuts out the middle layer—the need to
sell so you can buy. This change goes very deep, since in
capitalism the apparently harmless middle layer (the need to
make money) takes over and becomes the primary goal of
production, shifting the original goal (fulfilling people’s needs
and desires) into the background.
6.1.2 No Need to Sell—No Unemployment
In the market, you need money to get the goods you like to buy.
If you don’t have enough money, you need to sell something,
and if you don’t have anything else, you need to sell your own
labor capacity. But if nobody wants your labor, you are out of
luck. You are unemployed and will generally remain poor and
unable to get most of the things you would like to have.
In peer production there is no need to sell, neither your
labor capacity nor anything else. You will often be expected to
invest some labor to get the things you like to have, but this is
only to contribute your share to the overall effort. If there is
nothing left to do, there is no reason to work, hence the term
“unemployment” does not even make sense in the context of a
peer economy.
Whether and how much you work will depend only on the
effort necessary to get the goods you like to have. There is no
reason to work more and, in effect, it won’t even be possible
to make more contributions that will be recognized as such,
because, quite simple, there is “nothing left to do.”
6.1.3 Demand-driven Instead of Profit-driven Production
This is because peer production is entirely demand-driven, while
market production is profit-driven.
In peer production, things are produced and services are
organized if there are people who want to have them and
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who are willing to jointly spend the amount of labor that is
necessary to get them. In the market, conversely, prior demand
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for production.
If a company feels it can make a profit from selling a line of
products, it might work very hard on instilling demand in
potential customers; in fact, a good part of the effort of market
production goes into suggesting to people that they do have
demand for a specific product, whether they knew it or not.
On the other hand, demand, no matter how urgent, is not
enough to get a good produced. The market will not satisfy
demand if potential producers cannot make a profit from
selling to those who have the demand, or if they can make a
higher profit by producing something else. If you are poor,
your demands don’t count, unless they can be satisfied very
cheaply.
In peer production, no other preconditions are required
apart from the willingness to contribute your share to the
overall effort. It does not matter whether you are poor or rich.
In fact, these concepts do not even exist: some people will have
more things, others will have less, depending on their wishes
and preferences, but this does not influence their chances of
fulfilling any future needs.
In capitalism, the necessity to make profit does not only
influence which goods are produced, but also how they are
produced. Firms will be more successful if they keep not only
their current, but also their future profits in mind. Thus the
tendency of trying to “lock in” customers to prevent them from
switching over to the competition, and the tendency to build
products in such a way that they need expensive accessories
and expensive repairs or replacements if and when they break
down. They have no incentive to increase the longevity of
their products beyond that of the competition, since doing so
would only cut into their profits. And since they often benefit
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from selling resources and refills their products require, the
have little incentive to decrease resource usage.
In peer production, it would be silly to increase the effort
necessary for using, repairing, or replacing the things you
produce. Since the necessary effort is shared among all, it
would only mean that you have more to do.
In peer production, there is no necessity to make profit
that influences which goods are produced and how they are
produced. Instead, it is people’s preferences and priorities that
decide how they live and which goods (including services)
they produce. Areas such as health care and elder care will no
longer be subjected to profitability concerns, and neither will
anything else.
6.1.4 Competition Gets a Different Face
None of this is meant to imply that market players are in any
way immoral or bad. They are not. It’s simply that they do
not have any other choice, if they want to survive as market
players.
They cannot choose to cut profits out of other considerations,
unless all their competitors do the same (which they will
hardly do, unless forced by law). They have to reduce the cost
of production as far as possible, or else the customers will tend
to flock to competitors who are able to produce and hence sell
cheaper. And they have to keep their level of profits similar
to those of competing companies and of other sectors, or the
capital they need to keep or extend their market share will
tend to flow elsewhere (the latter point might be irrelevant for
small privately owned companies that do not need external
capital, but these usually find it hard enough to survive next
to far larger competitors anyway, so they have little or no
space to behave better than the giants). The rules of market
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competition ensure that companies must think primarily of
their profits—they cannot behave in any other way, or they
will lose in the market.
Conversely, in the peer economy, competition gets a different
face. For a project to be successful, it needs to attract sufficient
contributors to reach its goals. As long as projects working
on similar products both reach this goal, they have no need to
out-compete each other. In so far as they compete, it will be
more like a sporty challenge, each trying to show the others
that you can do better than they. It will be more a game than
a serious matter since the survival of the projects does not
depend on it.
As for attracting contributors, efficiency will still be an im-
portant factor for success: a project that manages to produce
equivalent goods with a lower amount of weighted labor will
be more attractive for users since they have to contribute less
to get what they like to have. But not all means of increasing
efficiency that work in capitalism will work in a peer economy.
Bad labor conditions or lax security standards, for example,
will hardly be a successful way of attracting contributors. Ac-
tually, such efforts would backfire even from an efficiency
standpoint: worse working conditions would make the respec-
tive tasks less popular for potential contributors, causing their
weight in the task auctioning system to go up. So even if the
amount of (unweighted) labor hours for producing an item in
such a way would be lower, its cost as measured in weighted
labor would probably be higher.
Other ways of increasing efficiency that are common in
the market would hardly be successful in a peer economy
due to the important role of reputation in peer production (cf.
Sec. 2.3). Reputation depends on the perception of a person
or project “doing the right thing,” and projects damaging
the environment or engaging in other harmful or dangerous
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behavior would hardly be perceived as “doing the right thing.”
Their reputation would dwindle, making it hard for them to
attract contributors, whose own reputation would suffer if
they were connected with such a project.
Similarly, keeping your business methods, knowledge, and
software secret is a frequent strategy of keeping a competi-
tive advantage in the market, but it would hardly work in
peer production with its philosophy of commons and sharing.
Violating this philosophy would hurt your reputation. Con-
versely, sharing your knowledge and your ideas is a certain
way of increasing your reputation (provided they are good).
In a market, it is a problem for companies if their new ideas
or methods are copied by others, since it takes away their
advantage in producing cheaper. In peer production, it is an
advantage, since many people will remember where the new
ideas came from, and your reputation will rise.
6.1.5 No Separation of Centers and Periphery
Market competition is a “game” that allows only a limited
number of winners. This leads to a tendency of the production
of specific goods to concentrate in the hands of a few corpo-
rations that have managed to out-compete the others (or to
buy them—-corporate mergers are an important ingredient of
success strategies since smaller players often lack the capacity
to compete with larger ones).
The establishment of such successful global players is hardly
possible without high amounts of capital to invest. Thus
these corporations tend to be headquartered in—or at least
financed from—one of the centers of capitalist production
(mainly North America, Western Europe, and parts of Asia).
This does not necessarily mean that the actual production
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takes place in these centers—they are just where most of the
profits go.
For the people outside these centers it is very hard to com-
pete successfully, since they usually lack the necessary capital
to do so. While it is not impossible to establish new centers
(as the Asian example shows), there is no way in which every
country or region could become a center. The existence of
centers depends on the existence of the periphery just like the
existence of winners depends on the existence of losers.
Peer production renders the separation of centers and pe-
riphery obsolete, since it doesn’t require capital or other pre-
conditions for successful participation and since peer projects
don’t compete in the same way as companies do. No matter
where people live, as long as they find enough co-participants
they can establish a successful project, without having to out-
compete projects pursuing similar activities.
In peer production, people jointly produce for themselves,
not for the market. People everywhere will be able to produce
for themselves whatever they would like to have; and since
peer production tends to treat knowledge and resources as
commons that are to be shared, they will all have similar
preconditions for doing so.
6.1.6 No Need to Reinvent the Wheel and Little Other
Overhead
Due to the tendency of peer production to favor openness and
sharing, innovations will spread much faster. They will also
require far less efforts to spread. In the market, companies
have to make huge efforts trying to duplicate innovations intro-
duced by their competitors (and in such a way that they won’t
violate any patents or copyrights of them). Alternatively, they
have to do without the innovations, meaning that they create
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products that won’t be as good as they could be otherwise
or whose production will take a higher effort than it would
otherwise.
In either case, the tendency of the market to keep inno-
vations secret or to treat them as property imposes a large
amount of additional labor that is unnecessary in a peer econ-
omy. In peer production, there is no need to reinvent any
wheels that have already been invented by others. Any in-
novations can immediately be adapted by whoever wants to
use them; and any further improvements made by others can
immediately flow back to the original innovator.
There are lots of other activities that are necessary or useful
in the market context but won’t be needed in a peer economy.
Peer projects have little or no reason to instill demand for
their products (cf. Sec. 6.1.3); they do not need to monitor
the activities of “competing” projects as closely as companies
do (since they aren’t competing in the market sense); and the
whole overhead of acquiring and retaining capital and keeping
shareholders happy will be gone.
Even more significant is the overhead imposed by the market
system outside of companies. Today, people spend innumer-
able hours trying to look for a job (especially those who cannot
find one) or training for better jobs without getting them, and
a huge bureaucracy is needed to deal with the jobless. There
are whole industries for investing and lending money and for
managing the profits accrued in the market. None of this is
necessary in a peer economy.
Moreover, the control structures imposed by current society
—laws, police, prisons, governments—are mainly needed to up-
keep the private property regime that the market requires (to
prevent people from selling or using things that are supposed
to be owned by others) and to prevent people from acquiring
money in ways that are considered socially unacceptable. A
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peer economy, where there is no need to earn money and
where people can get whatever they want by contributing to a
project of their choice, will only need much leaner versions of
such structures, if at all (cf. Sec. 8.4 for a longer discussion on
which laws and regulations might still be necessary).
Not only will peer production grant people an unprece-
dented amount of control over their own lives, it will also
require much less work for doing so. Without the need for all
the overhead activities imposed by the market and the private
property regime, peer production can reach an efficiency the
most ardent advocates of the market cannot even dream of.
6.1.7 The Peer Economy Works Around Scarcity, It Does Not
Need It
Markets only work for goods that are scarce, i.e., for which the
demand is higher than the available supply. Without scarcity,
when the supply of a good surpasses the demand, the market
price for the good will tend to tumble as each of the competing
producers tries to extend or to preserve their market share.
This will reduce the supply, since some of the producers will
not be able to produce so efficiently that they can sell at the
reduced price and still make a profit, or they will turn to other
business areas that allow them to draw a higher profit from
the invested capital. The price drop thus ensures that the
supply of a good falls until it is sufficiently scarce for prices to
stabilize again.
The resulting scarcity, however, follows from the decisions
of producers, it is not absolute. Usually, each producer could
easily increase the produced amount to fulfill additional de-
mand, but they will not do so if it would hurt their profits.
They will not sell at prices that would degrade their profit
level—indeed, they cannot, or their competition is likely to
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get the better of them, as discussed above. Because of this,
markets will hardly ever satisfy all demand, since not everyone
will be able to afford the price level that is best for profits.
Also, goods can only be sold in the market if people have
reason to buy them, and they won’t buy goods that they can
get in any other way that saves them the cost of buying. There-
fore the sellers in a market will generally try to destroy or
outlaw any alternatives that would allow people to access the
goods they produce (or similar ones) without paying for them.
Therefore companies whose business model is based on selling
software, music, or movies require copyright laws to prevent
people from just copying the items they are expected to pay
for, making things scarce that otherwise wouldn’t be (once
they have been produced).
Of course, the argument for such scarcity laws is that with-
out them, the items in question would not be produced at all,
since they couldn’t be produced with a profit. Within the con-
text of the market system, this is often enough true (not always,
since markets players are good at finding different business
models if any specific one doesn’t work). In the market, only
things that can be produced with a profit will be produced
at all, and only things that are scarce in some way or other
can be produced with a profit. Markets thus not only require
scarcity to remain stable, they also induce it in any good they
touch.
Peer production, on the other hand, does not need scarcity
at all. Instead, it treats scarcity as a problem to be dealt with.
And without the tendency of the market to induce it, scarcity
will probably not even be a very serious problem. Without
the scarcity induced by the necessity to make profits, only two
sources of scarcity remain: the limited availability of human
labor, and the limited availability of natural resources.
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Human labor, however, is not really scarce, as the existence
of massive unemployment and underemployment in current
economies shows. It will probably be even less scarce in a
peer production–based economy due to the efficiency increases
outlined above. Which goods are produced in a peer economy
and which aren’t does not depend on scarcity of human labor
but on the priorities of people.
Peer projects may be unable to reach their goals because
they fail to attract sufficient participants willing to make the
necessary contributions, but this is not a matter of the scarcity
of human labor—after all, the non-participants will hardly all
work until they drop. Instead, it expresses the priorities of
people: in such a case, most of them obviously prefer to spend
their lives in other ways than by contributing to the project in
question—even if they wouldn’t mind having the products of
the project, they apparently don’t consider it worth the effort.
Faced with a trade-off, they have made a decision. In peer
production, what is and what isn’t produced depends on the
choices of people, not on scarcity.
The limited availability of natural resources will continue to
be a problem in some cases, but with the resource allocation
model proposed above (Sec. 5.5) it will merely be a factor
that influences people’s decisions. Since scarce resources are
auctioned among those who want to use them, the effort re-
quired to produce a good that needs such a scarce resource
will automatically increase, and this will affect people’s deci-
sions about whether or not they are really willing the make
the necessary effort. Those who care most about the products
for which they need the resources will be willing to spend
the most effort to get them; and since effort is measured in
weighted labor, everybody will be in the same position when
deciding whether or not to make it. Whether or not scarce
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resources are involved, peer production is driven by people’s
decisions about where their priorities lie and how much they
really care for any good.
6.2 Differences from a Planned Economy
Since planned economies have not been very popular since
the collapse of the Soviet Union (or even before), there is
probably little need for a detailed critique and comparison.
The central difference between planned economies and a peer
economy is, of course, that in a peer economy there is no need
for hierarchical planning processes to decide which goods
to produce and how to allocate goods and resources. Peer
production avoids the whole bureaucratic overhead that is
necessary for a planned economy. In fact, as we have seen
above, the bureaucratic overhead that is needed for a peer
economy is lower than the overhead of the market, which in
turn is lower than the overhead of a planned economy.
More important than the overhead is the fact that people liv-
ing in a peer economy are in full control over their lives, while
in a planned economy they are not. In a peer economy, there
are no institutions that decide which people should do which
tasks and which resources they may use to do so. Instead,
everybody can decide according to their own preferences—of
course, the decisions of others will affect your own, by in-
fluencing the value of tasks and resources in the auctioning
systems, but the ultimate decision is up to you.
Planned production chronically suffers from planning errors,
where the production fails to satisfy all actual demand or
where unneeded items are produced. While this might be
considered a merely technical problem that could be addressed
by improved processes, the deeper problem remains that a
planned economy necessarily has to judge and prioritize the
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needs of the people living in it. A planned economy has
to decide which of your needs are sufficiently important to
be satisfied and which are not, but these are decision which
cannot really be made by anybody else than by you (no matter
whether such decisions are made by an elite of planners or
entirely democratic).
In the market, needs are generally not judged (which is
good), but your chances of satisfying them depend largely on
the money you happen to have. In peer production, needs
are not judged and they are prioritized only by the person
who has them. You can satisfy any needs without needing
anybody’s permission and without needing money, as long as
you are able and willing to make the necessary effort (which
will very often make it necessary to convince other people to
cooperate with you, since you would not be able to undertake
the necessary labor all by yourself), and as long as your needs
do not interfere with other people’s lives in ways they are
unwilling to accept (how to deal with such conflicts will be
discussed in Sec. 7.2).
Planned economies also suffer from the problem that pro-
ducers often have little incentive to care for the quality of their
products. They usually don’t produce for their use, but for oth-
ers; and since products are produced and allocated as decided
by a planning institution, the consumers have little choice
but to take what they get. In market systems, producers also
produce for others, but they must care for the quality of their
products sufficiently to prevent consumers from turning to the
competition. It is the fear of economic failure that ensures the
quality of products—but only in so far as consumers are likely
to notice, and only when there are competitors that feel that
it would benefit their profit level to do better than you. Peer
production goes further by abolishing the distinction between
producers and consumers—people jointly produce for their
89
6 Comparison with Other Modes of Production
own use, and thus have every incentive to make their products
as good as they want them to be.
The dependency on bureaucratic decision making for re-
source access explains two further problems that have been
observed in the Soviet bloc: the tendency to apply for more re-
sources than you really need (for the quite likely case that you
will only be granted a fraction of what you applied for); and
the tendency to hoard resources that you don’t currently need
but might need in the future (since you don’t know whether
you would be granted them when you need them). With the
proposed auctioning system for resources that cannot be made
available to all, peer production will not have such problems.
Even modern variants of planned economies that claim to
be highly democratic and participatory—such as the Parecon
(“participatory economics”) concept proposed by Michael Al-
bert (2004)—would impose a tremendous planning overhead,
and would interfere with people’s lives to a high degree. (In
Parecon, this interference comes largely in the form of “bal-
anced job complexes,” forcing people to do a variety of very
different tasks instead of letting them decide according to their
strengths and preferences.)
Oscar Wilde is supposed to have said that “the trouble
with socialism is that it takes too many evenings,” which
characterizes the planning and decision-making overhead of
planned economies quite well. Capitalism, on the other hand,
takes too many days which people have to spend doing work
(or looking for work) for which they often don’t specifically
care, but which they have to do in order to earn the money
they need. The peer economy gives the control over both your
evenings and your days back to you.
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Peer projects and local associations are self-organizing—the
participating people will figure out for themselves how to
arrange their lives. Still, since we are interested to learn more
about how life in a peer economy might be like, we will try to
make some educated guesses about their decisions.
7.1 Forms of Democratic Decision Making in Local
Associations
In Section 5.6.3 we discussed which modes the inhabitants
of local associations will prefer for decisions of local concern.
We supposed that they would prefer the democratic mode
for cardinal decisions such as which kinds of public services
and infrastructure to organize, while generally trusting details
of how to do so to the projects and people doing the actual
work. Democracy, however, comes in different shapes, and
which of them is most suitable depends on various factors
such as the number of people involved. Which modes of
democratic decision making can we expect to be employed in
the organization of local associations?
7.1.1 Decision Making in Local Communities and
Neighborhoods
Local communities with about 100,000 to 500,000 members (cf.
Sec. 5.3.2.1) should still be sufficiently small to rely on direct
democracy where all the people are eligible to make proposals
(for tasks to organize etc.) and to vote on proposals. Both
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agenda setting (making proposals) and voting can be supported
quite efficiently by software-based solutions.
There is, of course, another essential step between these
two steps: discussing the proposals made. This step is more
tricky, since local communities will generally be too large for
face-to-face meetings of all the people interested in discussing;
and software-based discussion channels (such as mailing lists
or discussion boards) are a good complement for face-to-face
discussions, but hardly a fully adequate substitute.
Electronic discussion forums at the communal level could,
however, be conveniently complemented with a two-level pro-
cess for face-to-face discussions, by relying on the neighbor-
hoods within a community for the first level. With about five
hundred to a few thousand inhabitants (cf. Sec. 5.3.2.3), neigh-
borhoods are small enough to allow everyone who cares to
participate in face-to-face discussions; the participants of such
neighborhood discussions could then send delegates to discus-
sions at the community level for voicing opinions and concerns
expressed during a neighborhood meeting. There would be
about one hundred to a few hundred neighborhoods in a com-
munity, making such delegate discussions quite feasible in
size.
Together with online discussions at the community level,
such a two-level discussion process should allow everyone
interested to get a clear picture of any decisions to make.
Anyway, we suppose that communal meta-projects will tend to
run quite smoothly without the need for much intervention; so
there probably won’t be that many decisions to make, once an
initial set of infrastructures and services to provide has been
agreed on and some basic decisions regarding the joining of
a distribution pool and the availability of resources have been
made.
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Similarly, we suppose that neighborhoods will not require
many formal decisions, since they are mainly coordination
points for ad hoc cooperation. As stated above, neighborhoods
are sufficiently small to allow face-to-face meetings, so relying
on direct democracy for what democratic decisions are still to
be made in this context shouldn’t be a problem.
7.1.2 Decision Making at the Regional Level and Beyond
Which modes of democratic decision making can we expect to
be employed for local decisions beyond the community level,
regarding the organization of regional meta-projects and any
superregional cooperation?
As stated above (Sec. 5.3.2.2), regions might comprise about
30 to 50 local communities with about 3 to 15 million inhabi-
tants. While direct democracy could still be an option for such
sizes, the problem of discussions becomes even harder. Instead,
regions might prefer to organize themselves as networks of
communities in a similar way to prosumer associations (cf.
Sec. 5.6.4), by setting up a regional coordination board compris-
ing one delegate for each participating community. Thus it
would be this coordination board of about 30 to 50 delegates
that makes the actual decisions regarding the organization
of the respective regional meta-project and related issues; the
inhabitants of each community would elect a delegate for this
board. Since the task of delegates would not be to decide
arbitrarily, but to speak for their community, we can expect
that such delegate positions would be revocable (cf. Sec. 5.6.2)
and that delegates would be bound by any specific decisions
of their community.
This form of organization scales well to further levels of co-
operation. If regions decide to cooperate at the superregional
level, each of the participating regional coordination boards could
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choose a delegate (any person they deem fit, not necessarily
a board member) to send to a superregional coordination board
which decides on the organization of superregional activities.
And for those tasks that they decide to handle on the global
level, superregions can appoint a global coordination board in
the same way. Similar to regional delegates, these superre-
gional and global delegates would probably be bound by any
decisions of the board that sent them.
7.1.3 Who Will Be Eligible to Take Part in Decisions?
The evolution of democracy shows a clear tendency to include
more and more people in the democratic process. In early
democracies such as ancient Greece, only a small minority of
people was eligible to take part in decisions (typically males
of “good origin” and with their own household). Since then,
the criteria for inclusion have gradually expanded. In cur-
rent democracies, almost everybody is eligible to participate,
with two notable exceptions: children and teens as well as
“foreigners.”
We suppose that, in the context of a peer economy, the
expansion of the inclusion process will continue and these
remaining exclusions will sooner or later fall. This is especially
relevant regarding the status of “foreigners”: most likely, ev-
erybody who is living in a local association for more then just
a few weeks (or maybe months) will be expected to contribute
their share to the local meta-projects; but for everybody who is
expected to contribute, it is essential that they also have a right
to take part in decisions. Otherwise they would be required
to work for goals which they did not choose and cannot influ-
ence, which would be a kind of forced labor and hardly fits
the pattern of non-coercive cooperation that is characteristic
for peer production.
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Children, on the other hand, probably won’t be expected to
contribute (cf. Sec. 8.1.1). This could be brought forward as an
argument to exclude them from the decision making process.
However, following this argument, old and ill people would
have to be excluded as well, which is not the case today and
does not sound like a good idea.
The alternative is to allow everybody living in a local associa-
tion to take part in the democratic process if and when they
want to do so, no matter their age or origin—this also fits better
with the tendency of peer production to move from status to
reputation (cf. Sec. 2.3) which renders outward characteristics
such as age less important. Obviously, babies won’t be able to
take part in decisions, and five-year-olds will generally have
other things on their minds; but we can see no plausible reason
why children and teens should be excluded if and when they
want to participate.
7.2 Stakeholder Involvement and Conflict Resolution
Peer projects, local associations, and prosumer associations
will have decision making structures (cf. Sec. 5.6) that can
deal with any conflicts concerning the organization of the
project or association. However, not all conflicts occur in such a
context. What if there are conflicts between different projects or
between a project and a local association; what about conflicts
between people that are unrelated to organizational issues?
It is important to realize that real conflicts about any action
can only occur between stakeholders, i.e., between people that
would both be affected by the action, at least potentially. If
you are not a stakeholder, you might be unhappy about other
people’s actions, but they are no real concern for you. There
is (for example) no reason for the Pope to intervene in other
people’s sex lives, unless they want to have sex with him. Any
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person can give recommendations to other people about how
they should live their lives, but whether or not they listen is
entirely up to them.
Stakeholders, on the other hand, clearly can expect to be
involved in any decisions that concern them. It would hardly
be fair if any person or institution could make decisions that
seriously affect other people’s lives (if only potentially, e.g., in
case of accidents) without their having a say in this matter. In
any such cases, the principle of consensus, or that least rough
consensus, seems reasonable; meaning that the stakeholders,
or at least most of them, have to reach an agreement for any
decision to be put into action.
A society can set up institutions to help ensuring that people
know about activities that might affect them in a non-trivial
way and that others cannot decide upon such activities behind
their back (stakeholder involvement) and to arbitrate if agree-
ment fails to emerge (conflict resolution). This might be a suit-
able task for the various levels of local associations discussed
above (Sec. 5.3.2), since effects are often limited to specific
areas. This would result in five levels:
1. The neighborhood level, comprising about five hundred to
a few thousand people.
2. The communal level, comprising about 100,000 to 500,000
people (in one hundred to several hundred neighbor-
hoods).
3. The regional level, comprising about 3 to 15 million people
(in about 30 to 50 local communities).
4. The superregional level, comprising about 150 to 500 mil-
lion people (in about 30 to 50 regions).
5. And the global level, comprising everybody on Earth (in
a dozen or a few dozen superregions).
To ensure that they are informed about decisions that con-
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cern them, people at each level could choose a delegate to send
to an information board at the next highest level. Thus there
would be four levels of information boards, from the commu-
nal level (comprising delegates from the neighborhoods) to
the global level (comprising delegates from each superregional
coordination board, cf. Sec. 7.1.2).
Each local association and each peer project that wants
to undertake activities that would affect others (outside the
association/project) in non-trivial ways would be expected
to inform the most suitable—i.e., the smallest—information
board about their plans to ensure that all stakeholders (or their
delegates) know what is going on. A conflict occurs when
stakeholders object to a planned activity but the project is not
ready to modify its plans in a way that is acceptable to all.
Information boards might agree on a protocol for dealing
with conflicts that the involved parties fail to resolve among
themselves; for example, by referring such conflicts to an arbi-
tration board that tries to mediate a solution that is acceptable to
all involved parties. As a general guiding principle, arbitration
boards should probably strive for rough consensus, meaning
that plans will not be realized if some of the stakeholders
have objections that cannot be addressed; but exceptions are
conceivable, for example, if an action is of great importance
for the people who want it and the objecting stakeholders are
less severely affected.
Information and arbitration boards will also be able to redi-
rect conflicts to a higher or lower level that they consider more
appropriate due to more or fewer people being actually in-
volved in a conflict. And delegates in information boards will
probably keep themselves informed about what is going on
in the information boards one level below their own, so the
higher-level information board can take over a conflict if there
are delegates for people who feel that they, too, are involved.
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In many cases there will be “meta-conflicts” about who is
or isn’t a stakeholder, i.e., whether people that object to other
people’s decisions are sufficiently affected to intervene. In-
formation boards will probably define guidelines to identify
stakeholders (you are affected if actions of others modify or
endanger your quality of life in a non-trivial way—you would
be affected by a new building that obscures your rooms, but
not by one that merely changes your view, unless the view
is one of the major features of your room and would be ru-
ined, etc.) Still, such meta-conflicts will remain and dealing
with them will be an important part of the conflict resolution
process.
The members of arbitration boards should be chosen among
all the people living in the respective area, they should not
speak for any specific group of people (as the delegates in the
other kinds of boards do). Some large current peer projects
have similar conflict resolution mechanisms which might serve
as models, notably the dispute resolution process1 of the
Wikipedia with its Arbitration Committee2 as last resort.
In case of non-compliance, when projects or people fail
to report relevant plans to the information board or if they
don’t comply with arbitration decisions, the usual sanctioning
mechanisms will come into play (cf. Sec. 5.6.1). Should flaming
and shunning be unsuccessful, various variants and grades
of exclusion and strategic non-cooperation are possible: people
might be refused access to the services of the local meta-projects;
projects can be excluded from the prosumer association they are
in; regional and superregional cooperation with a defaulting
local association could be suspended; people can always refuse
to contribute to projects or to acquire their products.
While even more drastic measures such as intervention by
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Resolving_disputes
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration_Committee
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force are conceivable, we doubt that they will be necessary. In
an economy where cooperation is essential, the most severe
forms of exclusion and strategic non-cooperation will probably
be enough to deal with any defectors.
7.3 Education and Learning
In a market economy, the amount and prestige of education,
especially formal education, a person receives is an important
factor in the competition for jobs and positions. Without
this competition, education and learning will probably take
a different shape, focused more on acquiring the knowledge
and skills you want or need rather than on spending certain
amounts of time in institutions and passing through a specified
set of courses. For sure, these two aspects of education are
not necessarily in conflict—but neither do they fit together as
closely as might seem.
As, for example, John Holt (1989) points out, learning is not
an isolated activity; it is a continuous, interactive process that
seems to be most successful when it happens in the context
of daily life. Learning is mainly a process of figuring things
out, a process of discovery (just like science). You learn best if
you have a reason for doing something, if you want to know
or be able to do something—small children learn to talk quite
effortlessly in this way, without any need for schools or other
formal institutions. Generally, learning seems to works best
while doing something “real,” if only as a game or experiment.
The best teaching method, therefore, is to support other
people figuring things out for themselves, doing them by
themselves, solving problems they like to have solved (or
are just curious about); teaching is not a process of piping
knowledge into somebody else’s head. The best learning
environment is the real world: to help children learn, Holt
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recommends to make things accessible for them so they can
explore them and try them out; to make it possible for children
to observe others (older children or adults) while doing what
they do and to help them doing it, if such help can be of use.
Both adults and children learn best when they really want to
learn, either out of a genuine interest or because they need
skills and knowledge for any activity they are doing or would
like to do.
In the market economy, the need to acquire degrees and titles
to better compete makes such an open concept of learning
hard to realize; and the formal framework of schools and
universities prepares young people for the formal framework
of the business world. In a peer economy, neither of these
concerns applies, rendering obsolete the formal framework of
education as we know it today.
The architect Christopher Alexander, whose work A Pattern
Language (1977) develops a method for creating livable (if
somewhat traditional) architecture but in doing so covers much
more, gives some impressions of how these activities might be
organized instead:
Network of learning: “Instead of the lock-step of compulsory
schooling in a fixed place, work in piecemeal ways to
decentralize the process of learning and enrich it through
contact with many places and people all over the city:
workshops, teachers at home or walking through the city,
professionals willing to take on the young as helpers,
older children teaching younger children, museums,
youth groups traveling, scholarly seminars, industrial
workshops, old people, and so on.” (Alexander et al.,
1977, Pattern 18, p. 102)
University as a marketplace: “Establish the university as a mar-
ketplace of higher education. As a social conception this
means that the university is open to people of all ages, on
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a full-time, part-time, or course by course basis. Anyone
can offer a class. Anyone can take a class. Physically, the
university marketplace has a central crossroads where its
main buildings and offices are, and the meeting rooms
and labs ripple out from this crossroads—at first concen-
trated in small buildings along pedestrian streets and
then gradually becoming more dispersed and mixed
with the town.” (Pattern 43, p. 234)
Master and apprentices: “Arrange the work in every work-
group, industry, and office, in such a way that work and
learning go forward hand in hand. Treat every piece
of work as an opportunity for learning. To this end,
organize work around a tradition of masters and appren-
tices: and support this form of social organization with
a division of the workspace into spatial clusters—one for
each master and his [or her] apprentices—where they
can work and meet together.” (Pattern 83, p. 414f)
Of course, local associations will decide for themselves how
to arrange learning and education, and it is quite possible that
they decide to continue the current formal arrangements, at
least for some time. But we would be surprised if they did so
in the long run, since, even though this might appear to be
reasonable now, it will hardly be reasonable then.
7.4 Creative Works and Other Freely Sharable Goods
There are many things that can be shared freely (everything
that can be encoded as information). Hence, according to the
tendency of peer production to share what you can (Sec. 4.4.1)
we may assume that they will generally be available without
restriction to anyone who wants them. This does not mean,
however, that their creation cannot be recognized as a contri-
bution within the task auctioning system of a peer project or
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local association that wants to have them. We can expect that
writing a book that is to be used for teaching (for example)
will be recognized as a contribution just as well as giving a
course where this textbook is used.
There is a risk that projects will stall the creation of such
freely sharable goods, hoping that other projects will create
them first—after all, once such a book has been created, it can
be used by anyone giving a course, not just the ordering project.
But several factors make us doubt that such stalling will be a
serious problem. It would be silly for a project to stall if the
others do the same, since this would prevent any activities for
which they need the work in question. And projects working
on similar topics will tend to keep each other informed about
their activities so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.
Projects interested in the same work might also decide to
explicitly join forces by founding an independent project for
creating it, sharing the effort required for this project among
themselves.
In any case, projects that only take without ever giving back
are likely to attract attention, causing embarrassment and loss
of reputation to their members. Conversely, positive reputation
for creating a work will go to the creators, not to users.
This task auctioning approach, however, works best for
works that are needed in the context of a larger project, such as
software or textbooks, manuals, and other kinds of nonfictional
works. It is harder to imagine for literature, music or movies.
Such works are not usually produced “on order,” and, while
they are enjoyed and appreciated, are not “needed” for any
practical purpose.
Does this mean that such works might no longer be created
in a peer economy when their creation is not honored with
money or as weighted labor? This is certainly a point we
do not have to worry about. People have always, and will
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always produce creative works. Not because they want to
make money, but because they have time on their hand and
a story to tell or a feeling to express. Or because they want
to increase their fame and reputation and hope to attract
lots of ardent admirers of their preferred gender(s). There
are many good reasons for being creative, and most of them
are unrelated to the necessity to earn money that dominates
current society. Far from stopping creativity, a peer economy
will give it more space to flourish, since artists are no longer
constrained by the pressure to be marketable and since most
people will probably have more time to spend as they like and
fewer things to worry about.
Nevertheless, the people living in a peer economy can rec-
ognize the authors, musicians, and movie makers they like,
beyond the increase in attention and reputation that automat-
ically follows from being an appreciated artist. While such
works can hardly be made “on order” and thus auctioned
as tasks to handle, they can still be recognized as valuable
contributions after they have been created.
The people living in a local association can reserve a certain
amount of weighted labor to honor artists living in their area,
by recognizing their creative work as contributions for their lo-
cal meta-project (cf. Sec. 5.3). This would mean that everybody
else would have to work very slightly more to organize the
public services and infrastructure required by the association,
while the recognized artists would be freed from participation
in these tasks, giving them more free time to create further
works. Of course, such a recognition will generally come only
post hoc, after an artist has already finished one successful
work—but this holds for market recognition of such works
just as well and will hardly be a serious hindrance.
To decide which works to recognize in this way, both popu-
lar success (music which made it to the top of the charts, most
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frequently read books) or “artistic value” (as judged by a jury
of experts) can serve as criteria. Preferably local associations
will honor works that satisfy either criterion, recognizing main-
stream success but also giving avant-garde, unconventional
artists a chance. They will probably recognize creative works
as a fixed amount of weighted labor depending on the kind
and size of a work, since the amount of labor that actually
went into creating a work will hardly be known after it has
been completed and since this labor cannot be auctioned and
hence not “weighted” anyway.
7.5 Styles of Production
As a general tendency, peer prosumers often seem to prefer
products that are modular, functional, and elegant.
Products that are modular, that can be broken down into
smaller modules or components which can be produced in-
dependently before being assembled into a whole, fit better
into the peer mode of production than complex, convoluted
products, since they make the tasks to be handled by a peer
project more manageable. Projects can build upon modules
produced by others and they can set as their own (initial)
goal the production of a specific module, especially if compo-
nents can be used stand-alone as well as in combination. The
Unix philosophy of providing lots of small specialized tools
that can be combined in versatile ways is probably the oldest
expression in software of this modular style.
The stronger emphasis on modularity is another phenome-
non that follows from the differences between market produc-
tion and peer production. Market producers have to prevent
their competitors from copying or integrating their products
and methods of production so as not to lose their competitive
advantage. In the peer mode, re-use by others is good and
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should be encouraged, since it increases your reputation and
the likelihood of others giving something back to you.
Peer producers jointly produce for their own use, which
explains their tendency to put functionality first. In the market,
non-functional differences often are the only way to gain a
competitive edge; in peer production there is no need for
such distinctions. Peer producers certainly care about form,
as shown by the innumerable skins and templates that change
the appearance of many popular free software solutions, but
putting form over function will hardly do—nobody would
bother to “skin” a software that does not do what they want it
to do.
Elegance is often closely related to functionality and to a cer-
tain simplicity that benefits modularity and re-use—“Elegance
is the attribute of being unusually effective and simple,” the
Wikipedia (2007) defines. Free software producers tend to
admire elegance especially, but not only, in design. Eric Ray-
mond (2001, Lesson 13) expresses this by quoting Antoine de
Saint-Exupéry: “Perfection (in design) is achieved not when
there is nothing more to add, but rather when there is nothing
more to take away.”
Modularity not only facilitates decentralized innovation, but
should also help to increase the longevity of products and
components. Capitalism has developed a throw-away culture
where things are often discarded when they break (instead
of being repaired), or when one aspect of them is no longer
up-to-date or in fashion. In a peer economy, the tendency in
such cases will be to replace just a single component instead
of the whole product, since this will generally be the most
labor-efficient option (compared to getting a new product, but
also to manually repairing the old one).
The logical equivalent to the modularity of products is the
decentralization of production processes. Current peer pro-
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duction processes tend to be extremely decentralized, since
they take place over the Internet and participants are often
distributed over the whole globe (or the parts of it where reli-
able Internet access is common and affordable). Future peer
projects that produce material items will be stronger tied to
places where the physical production takes place. Probably
this will often lead to a combination of global cooperation
for designing products and local production for physically
manufacturing them.
But decentralization will hardly become extreme since many
production processes require a sufficiently large scale to be
efficient—it would be impossible or at least pointless for each
village to have their own computer chip factory, since setting
up and maintaining the necessary facilities requires a huge
effort which will reasonably be shared by a high number
of people. Trying to minimize their efforts, peer producers
will find suitable trade-offs between production effort and
transportation effort.
Still, physical production in a peer economy will certainly
be far more decentralized than in the market economy, where
the effects of market competition favor centralization by elimi-
nating most players. Also, regardless of our warnings about
overestimating “personal fabricators,” recent technological de-
velopments go in a direction that shifts the balance in favor
of smaller-scale production. Fabbing and similar technologies
will support localized production in so far as they are avail-
able, and there is no need for fabricators to be “personal” to
be useful. Existing technologies such as rapid manufacturing
(Hopkinson et al., 2006) already allow flexible industrial pro-
duction in small series and might be just as useful for a peer
project or a local community as a personal fabricator would
be for a single person.
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The relative preference for decentralization will probably
also affect areas such as energy. Even more important than the
local availability of energy sources will be their sustainability.
Peer projects and local associations will prefer energy sources
that are used (such as solar energy, biomass, wind power, or
hydropower) instead of used up (such as oil). If not for the
sensible reason that they want to preserve and protect the
environment they are living in, they will do so for the simple
reason that non-renewable resources, if still in high demand,
will draw enormous prices in the distribution pool as soon as
they become scarce. Energy sources with a risk of potentially
high damage such as nuclear power will hardly be employed,
since they will be blocked by stakeholders who would have to
live with the risk (cf. Sec. 7.2).
Regarding means of transport, local associations will proba-
bly prefer to provide for non-rival solutions—i.e., solutions
that scale efficiently instead of deteriorating if the number of
users increases—since this is the most effective and fair way of
providing transportation infrastructure and services for their
inhabitants. Cars in cities and for long-distance travel are a
notorious failure in this respect, as the existence of traffic jams,
car-related pollution, and lack of parking demonstrates. In-
stead, local meta-projects will mainly cater for public transport
(buses, trams, metros, trains, etc.) for densely populated areas
such as cities and for long-distance travel.
Personal cars will remain popular in rural areas where the
population is too distributed for effective public transportation
systems. Even there, a good and versatile public transport
system or a comparable solution would be important to bring
mobility to children and old or disabled people. For short
and medium distances, non-obtrusive personal vehicles such
as bicycles will be a good solution everywhere. And to cover
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situations where other means of transport are inadequate or
absent, local communities and neighborhoods can provide
shared community cars/vehicles.
108
8 Concerns
Prior to concluding this text, we will discuss questions and
concerns that might arise in regard to the peer economy.
8.1 How to Handle Contributions?
8.1.1 What About People Who Cannot Contribute?
The peer economy, by default, is about effort sharing—people
jointly contributing to a common goal that none of them could
reach alone. But not everyone will be able to contribute. There
are various good reasons to exempt people from contributing—
children, people who are too old to work, people who are ill
or disabled, pregnant women, parents with young children,
. . . . The people living in a peer economy will need to deal
with such exemptions: (1) they will need to decide who is
exempted but eligible for goods; (2) they will need allocation
models allowing exempted people access to goods without
having to contribute anything in return; and (3) they will need
to redistribute the effort necessary to produce these goods
among the remaining contributors.
When discussing the allocation of natural resources in a
peer economy, we noted an interesting effect of auctioning
resources that cannot be distributed on a flat-rate basis (cf.
Sec. 5.5.3): the effort that the winner of a resource auction has
to contribute in order to get the resource will make all the
other goods distributed in the same distribution pool slightly
cheaper, since no effort has been spent to create the resource
(it is not the result of human labor). Distributing products to
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people who don’t have to contribute any effort has the inverse
effect. The effort necessary for the production of these goods
would be redistributed among all the people contributing to
the pool—all the goods distributed through the pool would
become slightly more expensive.
This offers a simple and flexible solution for question 3 (how
to redistribute the effort), provided that the people participat-
ing in a pool can agree on answers to the other two questions.
Again we can look at the issue of resource allocation for inspi-
ration: above we noted that the effect of resource distribution
on the cost of all other goods means that the people sharing
their resources in the same pool will have to reach an agree-
ment on which resources to consider available, and proposed a
bottom-up mechanism for making such decisions (Sec. 5.6.3.2).
This also holds when a distribution pool is used to redistribute
effort for exempted persons. The same bottom-up decision
making process can therefore be extended to answer the two
remaining questions: how to define conditions for exemption
and how to handle the allocation of goods that cannot be freely
shared (cf. Sec. 4.4.2) in such cases.
A possible approach to the second question would be to con-
sider non-contributors as “average” contributors: to calculate
the average amount of weighted labor the contributors have
put into the distribution pool over the last year (or so) and to
entitle each non-contributor to choose among the results of the
projects as if she had contributed this average amount of labor.
Alternatively, the involved local associations might decide to
grant access to ex-contributors based on their personal average
of contributions over their active years. This would allow peo-
ple who had preferred to work harder in order to get more, or
more expensive, things, to continue their standard of living.
The exact details will have to be agreed on within and be-
tween the involved local associations, and they will certainly
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lead to some occasional grumbling by either non-contributors
or contributors (or both). However, we assume that, as a ten-
dency, these decisions will be fair to both contributors and non-
contributors. There will hardly be enough non-contributors
to press unfair conditions on the contributors; and the con-
tributors will know that they will sooner or later become
non-contributors themselves, more likely than not, so it would
by silly for them to treat non-contributors badly.
Also, while people and local associations participating in
the pool won’t be able to opt out from the reached agreements
(since the necessary effort is automatically redistributed among
all the contributions to the pool), they can always complement
them with their own alternative redistribution schemes if they
consider them insufficient. The inhabitants of a specific local
association might prefer to consider further persons exempted
or to handle allocation more generously. If they fail to change
the criteria for the whole pool, they can still decide to ap-
ply these more generous conditions within their own area,
distributing the additional necessary effort among themselves.
One thing that might be self-evident but is still noteworthy
because it differs from current practice is that an exemption
from contributing will hardly be a prohibition to contribute.
In free software projects, nobody checks your age to decide
whether you are “old enough” or “young enough” to con-
tribute, and we see no reasons why future peer projects should
introduce such tests. People triggering an exemption clause
will not be expected to contribute, but they will be allowed to
do so, if they feel like it.
The involved local associations will have to decide whether
to treat such actual contributions as additional to the “virtual”
contributions assumed for an exempted person (so you can
get more goods if you contribute somewhat though you are
exempted), or whether to consider them as alternative (so it is
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the maximum of your actual and your virtual contributions
that counts, not their sum). A good compromise might be
to treat such voluntary contributions as additional, but to
recognize only 50% of their effort.
8.1.2 What About People Who Don’t Want to Contribute?
What if there are people who are perfectly able to contribute
and not exempted, but who refuse to contribute anything
and still expect to get a portion of the non-sharable results
produced by a project?
We don’t suppose that this would be a frequent situation—it
would be pretty silly for people to expect others to work for
their benefit, while refusing to give anything back. If some
people do, they can of course try to convince the others to
work on their behalf, but we suppose that they would need
good arguments to win them over. It is possible that they can
make a good case why they, too, should be exempted. But
unless they can, they will probably have to choose whether
they want to participate in a project or association (with both
the requirements and benefits this entails) or whether they
don’t. Nobody will be forced to cooperate with others, but
if you refuse to cooperate with others, you can hardly expect
them to cooperate with you.
This does not mean that you would have to starve if you
refuse to cooperate. People might be well be (consciously)
lax in controlling who has access to basic foodstuffs (such as
available on a flat-rate basis); they might grant free access
to lodgings that are being re-auctioned or that fail to attract
anybody willing to live there; and they would certainly not
refuse basic health care to anybody who needs it. But a life of
non-cooperation would be much harder and less pleasant than
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a life of cooperation, and we doubt that many (if any) people
would choose it.
In capitalism, the primary reason why people “drop out of
the system” is that they have lost a job (or never held one) and
sooner or later realize that their chances of finding a new one
are so low that they just give up. Or people are unwilling to
work for others. But in the peer economy, you don’t need to
find a job, you only have to choose among the tasks that need
to be done, and there should always be some suitable ones.
And you don’t work for others, but with others, which is a big
difference. Because of this, we would not be surprised if this
problem never arises. But if it does, people will find suitable
ways of dealing with it.
8.1.3 How to Decide Which Contributions to Accept?
We have assumed that projects whose results cannot be copied
freely will often share the efforts necessary for production
along with the benefits, requiring those who want to benefit
to contribute their part to the overall effort (cf. Sec. 4.2). It
is important that this requirement should be used only for
effort sharing, it should not become an exclusion mechanism.
It would be bad if people were prevented from benefiting from
the material results of a project because they cannot contribute
anything in return.
There are thus two goals that will sometimes be in conflict:
on the one hand, projects will want to ensure that all tasks are
handled well and reliably; on the other hand, people will need
to be able to contribute in some way.
This problem should be alleviated through the existence
of distribution pools as huge shared task auctioning systems
(cf. Sec. 5.2). Such a shared auctioning system will offer a
high variety of tasks, requiring widely varying skills and
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capabilities, so there should be a good choice of suitable tasks
for everybody (especially since some tasks won’t require any
special skills at all, and since people can learn skills they don’t
yet possess).
Projects participating in a distribution pool will have reason
to strive for a good balance between ensuring that the quality
of contributions is high and between being overly picky about
potential contributors. If they were to accept lousy contribu-
tions, they would risk their reputation and the success of their
project, and in occasional cases even their health or their lives.
But if they reject good contributions, waiting instead for others
to come along, the relative value of the unassigned task in the
labor weighting system will automatically go up, increasing
the overall effort necessary to reach their goals.
One risk that must be taken seriously is that people’s choices
regarding what they do and the decisions of projects regarding
whose contributions to prefer can be influenced by prejudices
about which people are better at which tasks. People might
consciously or subconsciously base their evaluations of actual
or potential contributions somebody offers on irrelevant cri-
teria such as her gender, “race,” origin, or age. And people
might base their decisions about which tasks they themselves
want to handle on prejudices about what people “like them”
are supposed to do (or to be good at), instead of letting their
own interests and strengths prevail.
This is not only a problem for the affected person, since it
restricts her choices and might reduce her happiness and her
self-esteem, but also for the involved projects. Task auctioning
systems will run more smoothly if everybody is able to choose
freely among all the available tasks according to their own
preferences; and the average quality of contributions will be
higher if it is only the quality of contributions that determines
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which contributions are accepted, instead of prejudices about
contributors.
It is thus in the best interest of everyone to try to reduce such
prejudices as far as possible. Of course, this does not mean that
they will never influence decisions, but it should be possible
to largely reduce their effects, by spreading the knowledge
that this problem exists and that it should be consciously
counteracted, and by complaining about unfair decisions. The
usual sanctioning mechanism of the peer economy (“flaming
and shunning” and, if necessary, exclusion and strategic non-
cooperation) can be applied against people or projects who
refuse to overcome their prejudices.
Forking is another option: if a project is arbitrary or unfair
in its dealings with potential contributors, they can always
found their own alternative project; and due to the tendency
to treat software, designs and other information as part of the
commons (“Share what you can,” cf. Sec. 4.4.1), the hurdles for
doing so should not be too high. In many cases, it might also
be possible to adapt the practice of the scientific community
to perform blind reviews, where the quality of contributions (or
the suitability of applications for any given task) is evaluated
with all personal information about the contributor, and possi-
bly about her prior occupations and activities, being hidden
from the evaluators.
8.1.4 What About Tasks That Are Not Recognized as
Contributions?
What about activities that are not distributed through any task
auctioning systems? Isn’t there a risk that such activities will
still be distributed in a biased way, mainly to persons of one
gender, for example?
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In capitalism, there has long been a gender-specific division
of work, where women were expected to do the housework,
care for the kids and do other unpaid activities, while men
were expected to earn the money for their family. While the
part about “earning the money” has meanwhile been relaxed,
it is still mainly women doing the unpaid domestic work (in
addition to any paid jobs they are holding). Isn’t there a risk
that such an unfair division of work will be perpetuated into
a peer economy?
Yes, this risk exists, and it will be up to the people living
in the peer economy to deal with it. In so far as tasks are
distributed by personal agreements instead of being auctioned,
the peer economy does not in any way ensure that they will be
distributed fairly. It will be up to the persons arranging such
agreements to take care that they are fair and do not stipulate
people’s roles according to their gender or other irrelevant
criteria. In the mentioned case, it would be up to the men
to take care that they do not expect more of the women than
they themselves are willing to give, and it would be up to
the women to protest, and to refuse to partake in any unfair
agreements (to “go on strike,” if necessary) if the men fail to
do so.
Also, it is possible to use task auctioning even within the
context of individual households or groups of households
to avoid the arbitrariness that individual agreements might
impose. And if the people participating in any task auctioning
system find that tasks are still distributed unevenly according
to gender (or some other arbitrary criterion), they could decide
to set up separate auctioning systems for women and men,
thus inciting men to do tasks that so far have been mainly
handled by women (since these tasks will be weighted higher
in the “male” auctioning system), and vice versa.
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The peer economy does not solve all problems by itself, but
it gives the people better preconditions for solving them than
they have now.
8.2 How to Handle Effort?
8.2.1 What About Huge or Uncertain Efforts?
Distribution pools (cf. Sec. 5.2) are a way of sharing effort be-
tween projects that allows you to get goods from many differ-
ent projects without having to contribute to all of them. By
providing a single shared system for the distribution of tasks
and goods, distribution pools allow you and your project to
produce goods for the benefit of others, and get in turn access
to the goods produced by others, without requiring everyone
to directly contribute to all of the projects whose products
they like to have. This effort-sharing mechanism works by
distributing goods produced by your project to people who
want them and consider them “worth the effort,” i.e., who
are willing to contribute the same amount of effort (weighted
labor) back to the pool so you can get some goods produced
by others. This means that your effort will only be recognized
after you have finished and distributed goods that others want
to have.
What if a huge preparatory effort is required until any goods
can be produced, say for building an intricate factory such as
necessary for producing microprocessors or other computer
equipment? What if it is initially uncertain if your efforts will
indeed lead to any usable goods, say if the technical feasibility
of your plans cannot be determined without further research
or experiments? In such cases, it is quite possible that there
won’t be normal projects willing to undertake the necessary
work. If an uncertain attempt fails, the project members would
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have wasted all their efforts; otherwise, they might have to
wait a long time until their effort turns into usable goods (for
others, and therefore for themselves).
In such cases, it might be up to local associations or prosumer
associations to pitch in and to mitigate the risk or the delay
by distributing it among their members. The inhabitants of
a local association (especially a larger one such as a region)
might decide to add the tasks necessary for a huge or uncertain
undertaking to its local meta-project (cf. Sec. 5.3). This would
mean that initially, while preparations or research are under
way, the inhabitants of the association will all have to work
slightly more, since the required effort is distributed evenly
among them. If the undertaking is successful, this effect can
later be recovered by distributing the produced goods in the
usual way both inside and (through a distribution pool) out-
side the local association—inhabitants not interested in the
produced goods will now have to work slightly less, until the
advanced effort has been recovered.
Prosumer associations (cf. Sec. 5.4) or other groups of projects
can advance effort in the same way, if they consider an activity
useful or necessary for their purposes. In this case, advance
effort will be added to the tasks the participating projects have
to handle, so everything produced by them will temporarily
become slightly more expensive (as measured in production
effort). If production is successful, their production effort
will temporarily decrease, since they now benefit from the
effort contributed by others in return for the effort they had
advanced before.
Usually the members of a local or prosumer association will
only be willing to safeguard production in this way if suffi-
ciently many of them take an interest in the project in question
(as potential users, contributors, or both) and if they consider
the people willing to undertake the work as competent and
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trustworthy—otherwise they will hardly be willing to take the
risk of having wasted effort if the undertaking ends in failure,
especially if the successful completion of a project is uncertain.
If they consider the chances of success sufficiently high, they
might also safeguard an undertaking without a personal inter-
est in the outcome, knowing they themselves might some day
benefit from such mutual safeguarding.
If neither prosumer nor local associations are willing to safe-
guard a huge or uncertain project, production may still take
place if there are sufficiently many contributors willing to take
the risk, either in hope of future recognition (if their activity
finally leads to useful goods) or just “for the sake of it.” Also,
potential consumers interested in getting something produced
can decide to support the producers by pre-recognizing their
effort (as if they had already received the goods), even if they
don’t want to get involved into the actual production process.
Efforts that don’t result in any usable goods (or not immedi-
ately, at least), such as basic research, are best coordinated by
local or prosumer associations, so the necessary effort (though
not the actual work) will be shared among all. But if no asso-
ciation sees the benefits of a research project, it is still quite
possible that there will be people willing to do the work (even
though their efforts won’t be recognized as such), out of inter-
est in the outcome or in hope of increasing their reputation.
We suppose that the effort people will have to spend for co-
producing the infrastructure, services, and other goods they
want to have won’t be that high, leaving them lots of time and
energy to pursue other activities.
8.2.2 Effort Shifting
What if you are not exempted from contributing (cf. Sec. 8.1.1),
but would prefer not to contribute anything for a few months
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or years, so you can spend this time for traveling, relaxing, or
some private project of your own, without distractions?
The peer economy works by distributing the effort necessary
to produce goods among the people who want to have them.
Therefore, shifting effort to some earlier or later time is not
trivial. You cannot simply save effort for later by contributing
more in the present and claiming some goods in return for it in
the future—in general, effort is needed when goods are being
produced, not later or earlier. Short delays will hardly be a
problem—people won’t mind if a few weeks or months pass
until you acquire goods for the effort you have contributed (or,
if they trust you, the other way around). But if you want to
advance or postpone your required part of the effort for longer
periods of time, some explicit agreements are necessary.
Local associations are in a good position to make such agree-
ments. If some members temporarily contribute more than
required to a local meta-project, everybody else will have to
contribute slightly less; if the advance-contributed effort is
later claimed, the others will have to contribute slightly more.
As long as the shifted effort is only a small proportion of the
overall effort required for the meta-project, this should not be
a problem and it should all sum up in the end.
Hence, local associations might decide to grant their inhabi-
tants the possibility of sabbaticals, of periods where they don’t
have to contribute anything, by allowing them to contribute
some more effort than required and later to claim services and
any other goods in return for the advanced effort. If local asso-
ciations organize their activities in the context of a distribution
pool, as we suppose (cf. Sec. 5.3.3), this advanced effort can
later be spend on any goods and resources distributed through
the pool, not just on those organized by the local association.
For example, if you have advanced 1000 weighted hours and
your local association requires 600 weighted hours as yearly
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contributions, you won’t have to contribute anything for a year
and you’ll still have 400 weighted hours left to get other goods.
So as not to jeopardize the smooth running of the meta-
project, local associations might impose limits on the effort
that can be pre-contributed in this way (say, no more than two
years of average contributions). We suppose that they will be
quite willing to grant this option, since many people will like
the possibility of sabbaticals.
8.3 What About Migration?
We stated above (Sec. 2.2) that cooperation in a peer context
is always voluntary, never coerced. If people want to leave a
peer project or a local association, they are free to go. This
freedom to leave or to “fork” is an essential aspect of peer
cooperation—but it would become effectively void if there
were no places to go to. In case of normal peer projects, this is
less of an issue, since you can create new “places” at will, by
founding a new project and inviting others to join you. But for
local associations (cf. Sec. 5.3) the situation is different: since
local associations take physical space on Earth, founding a
new one will generally not be an option, since there won’t be
suitable spaces left.
In local associations, the right to leave thus needs to be com-
plemented with a right to join, or it won’t be effective. Local
associations adhering to the spirit of peer cooperation will not
only let their inhabitants go if they want to go, but they will
also let others join the association if they want to. Indeed, in a
society based on commons and not on property, it would be
hard to justify why an area should be treated as the exclusive
property of the people who happen to be born there.
Of course, local associations will expect potential immi-
grants to contribute their share to the organization of local
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infrastructure and public services just like everyone else; and
they will expect them to make any preparations that are neces-
sary for doing so (such as learning the local language). Such
requirements are reasonable and hardly problematic, but they
alone might be insufficient to handle migration. What can
popular local associations do to avoid being overrun by immi-
grants?
8.3.1 Auctioning of Grounds and Houses as Regulation
Mechanism
Once more, auctioning can come to the rescue. Auctioning
grounds and houses will make living in popular places less
attractive (due to higher prices), while increasing the attrac-
tiveness of unpopular places. This will only work if grounds
and houses in both popular and less popular places are as-
signed through the same auctioning system, since, in the peer
economy, it is only the relative prices that are modified through
auctioning—the effort required for building and maintaining
houses stays the same, but it is distributed in a different way.
But as long as the grounds and houses of sufficiently many
local associations are allocated through the same distribution
pool (cf. Sec. 5.2), this will hardly be a problem, since such
distribution pools should be large enough to comprise both
popular and less popular local associations.
In this way, potential immigrants will think twice before
moving into very popular (and thus high-priced) areas. This
benefits local associations that are popular immigration targets:
it saves them from becoming overcrowded or else having
to resort to dubious coercive measures to keep others out.
The advantage for other, less popular associations lies in the
effort-redistribution effect of auctioning: the higher prices for
grounds and housing in other areas automatically cause the
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prices of all the other goods and resources distributed through
the pool (including grounds and housing in their own area) to
go down.
This effect of course also means that the people living in a
popular area will have to pay (contribute) more for housing
than they would otherwise. This effect can be mitigated by
granting more favorable conditions to the locals of any specific
community than to recently immigrated people. One option
would be to calculate the additional effort that the people
living in a popular local community have to contribute due
to their grounds and houses being auctioned openly in the
distribution pool instead of just among themselves; and to
give half the effort back to the community. This effort could be
distributed evenly among all the locals (say, among everybody
who lived there five years ago), granting each of them a certain
amount of weighted hours that they can spend for housing or
other goods and resources from the pool (cf. Section A.4 in the
mathematical appendix for a more detailed treatment). The
various local associations participating in a distribution pool
will have to agree on the exact terms of such an arrangement.
This might involve some negotiation due to the differing in-
terests of popular and less popular places, but in the end it
shouldn’t be too hard to reach an agreement, since both benefit
from a functioning system.
8.3.2 Migration of Non-Contributors
What about the migration of people who are exempted from
contributing (cf. Sec. 8.1.1)? In general, this should not be
a problem, since we noted above that it makes sense for all
the local associations participating in a distribution pool to
agree on common conditions for exemptions. Thus, the effort
spent on behalf of non-contributors will be evenly distributed
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among all contributors to the pool, regardless of where they
live. However, if some local associations have agreed on more
generous conditions in regard to non-contributors in their
own area, they might decide not to grant these conditions to
newcomers who have made no or few contributions to their
local meta-project.
Only if non-contributors want to move between local as-
sociations participating in different distribution pools, things
become more complicated, since the members of the target
distribution pool might be unwilling to work on behalf of
people who never have contributed, and probably never will.
This will probably be another factor promoting the emergence
of a single global distribution pool, since people will like to
have unimpeded global mobility, regardless of whether they
can (still) contribute or not.
However, as long as this does not happen, different distri-
bution pools can still negotiate agreements on how to handle
migration in such cases. For example, they might keep a tally
of how much effort the members of a distribution pool spend
on behalf of exempted persons immigrated from other pools,
and balance the difference from time to time. This would
ensure full mobility even across different distribution pools.
8.4 Won’t There Be Need for Further Laws and
Standards?
Won’t a peer production–based society need further regulation
mechanisms beyond those we have already discussed? We do
not think so.
In market-based societies, regulation mechanisms such as
laws and standards are essential to constrain the effects of the
market. The consequence of market competition (cf. Sec. 6.1.4)
is that the worst practice becomes a de facto standard all the
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others are compelled to follow. If a company manages to
reduce its production costs by treating its workers badly, by
forgoing safety precautions, or by damaging or endangering
the environment, it puts strong pressure on its competitors to
engage in similar practices, since they have to adjust their own
production costs in order to remain competitive. Therefore
laws and standards regulating how workers and the environ-
ment are to be treated are crucial. They are the only way to
make the worst—i.e., the de facto standard—less bad than it
would be otherwise.
The peer economy is far more self-regulating in this respect.
There is no need to enforce labor standards on projects, since
it is the people in a project who decide on their own labor
conditions. People will hardly impose bad or dangerous con-
ditions for their own work; and if they hope to find volunteers
through a task auctioning system, it would be pointless to
do so, since this would reduce the number of volunteers and
hence cause the cost of the task to go up instead of down (as
already mentioned in Section 6.1.4).
Similarly, there is no need for peer projects to adapt practices
that harm or endanger the environment, regardless of what
other projects do; and projects still doing so will likely see
their reputation and attractiveness sink, making it reasonable
for them to change their behavior for purely selfish reasons.
The effects of market competition reward those that do bad, as
long as they can get away with it. The peer economy, on the
other hand, favors those that behave well, that “do the right
thing,” since you need to attract contributors who will care for
their own reputation and therefore for yours.
Moreover, prosumer associations can define guidelines that
projects participating in an association are supposed to follow
(cf. Sec. 5.4.3). This will help to ensure that suitable standards
are kept by most projects, as projects violating these guidelines
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will probably have more difficulties in finding contributors and
consumers. They also risk being excluded from the prosumer
association, losing the benefits of horizontal coordination it
offers (cf. Sec. 5.4).
Finally, whenever people want to do something that seri-
ously affects the lives of others, the mechanisms for stakeholder
involvement and conflict resolution (Sec. 7.2) come into play. Ac-
tivities that endanger others or the environment they live in
are likely to be stopped at this stage, if not before. The peer
economy does have regulation mechanisms for such situations;
they just don’t need a state or other “sovereign” to be effective.
This also covers what need for other laws there might arise.
Law is essentially a conflict resolution mechanism. If there is
no conflict, if everybody involved agrees to an activity, there is
no reason to “outlaw” it and to prosecute it as a crime.
Of course, the conflict resolution institutions will need to
deal with and sanction defectors—people who violate or harm
others or who disregard the wishes and decisions of stake-
holders in other ways; and people who use threats or deceit
to make others agree to something they would not otherwise
agree to. And they will need to take care to detect and han-
dle conflicts that are not apparent (e.g., because the victim
has been intimidated into remaining silent). When there is a
conflict, society might have to intervene to make sure that it
is resolved in a fair manner and that one side does not lose
because they are weaker or otherwise disadvantaged. But
when there is no conflict, there is no need for law.
8.5 Won’t Such a Society Revert to a Market Economy?
Is there a risk that a peer production–based society would not
be stable, but would revert to a market-based economy sooner
or later?
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For one, let’s make it clear that this would not be a risk but a
possibility—if people prefer an alternative mode of production
instead of the dominant one, they certainly have the right to
choose it. But we don’t think it very likely that they would pre-
fer the market economy. The market requires people who sell
their own labor capacity; if there is nobody willing to sell her
labor capacity, no market-based production is possible (aside
from very limited forms of barter exchange which wouldn’t
be a serious alternative).
But when given the choice between cooperating freely with
others to produce what they want or else submitting them-
selves to the command of others in order to earn money which
then allows them to buy some of the goods they want (pro-
vided they manage to get hold of a suitable position and that
somebody else is producing those goods), we doubt that many
people would choose the second option. It would be less ef-
ficient because of the additional indirection and the various
ways in which the necessity to remain competitive distorts
market production (cf. Sec. 6.1). It would restrict their freedom
since they have to subordinate themselves to the command of
others. And it would certainly be less fun.
Moreover, the laws of market competition make sure that
market participants are never really in control, regardless of
their position in the production process. Even if it is you who
command others and not the other way around, you are not
free in your decisions. All you can do is to try to find out
what the market postulates and implement it as good as you
can, or else to fail. Today, these laws of the market are often
perceived as “laws of nature” that seem to be as inevitable as
the laws of gravity, and therefore they are accepted. We doubt
that people would choose to voluntary re-submit themselves
to these laws (and thereby resign most of their freedom in
regard to future choices) once they have realized that they are
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not “laws of nature” at all, but merely artifacts of a specific
system of production.
Today, the market only works because most people are
forced to sell their labor capacity, or else to forgo most of their
needs and desires and live a life of destitution and hardship.
The market is dominant since there hasn’t been a suitable
alternative, but the emergence of peer production is changing
this.
For sure, there will be defenders of the current market-and-
state system—especially those who have power or privilege
to lose—that will do everything they can to prevent people
from realizing that they have a choice between peer production
and market production. They will use tricks, propaganda,
laws, and possibly force in an attempt to stop the spreading
of peer production. But if and when the proponents of peer
production win this struggle, if and when a sufficient number
of people realize that peer production is an alternative, we
doubt that the market will stand a chance.
8.6 Aren’t There Many Variants to the Proposed Model?
Aren’t there many ways in which an actual peer economy
might and will be different from the model we have proposed
in this text? There certainly are.
Our goal was to find out whether a society where peer
production is the primary mode of production is possible, and
how it might be organized. For this it was necessary to develop
one model—or a family of models—of such a society, but it
was not necessary (and would have been infeasible) to develop
all possible models. Indeed, we have often enough mentioned
throughout the text that there might be other possibilities.
In case that some aspects of the proposed model seem arbi-
trary, we would like to point out the underlying principles that
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guided our choices. We attempted to find sensible solutions to
the problems that the people cooperating in peer mode will
face—trying, in so far as possible, to regard these problems
from the perspective of somebody living in a peer economy,
not from somebody living in capitalism. We tried to look for
solutions that correspond to the philosophy of peer production
as we can observe it today: solutions that emphasize commons
and sharing; where reputation matters and status doesn’t; solu-
tions that rely on free cooperation and do not require coercion
of any kind. We tried to look for those solutions that might
seem most sensible to the people living in such a society, and
that will work well for everybody, without requiring people
to be idealists or to fit into other patterns that might not be
appropriate for them.
Actually, there have not been as many choices in finding the
proposed model as one might think. In many cases, possible
alternatives come to mind, but if you think them through you
will notice that they would not work, or that they would have
some unpleasant side effects. A society is not like a heap of
stuff you can pile up in any way you like; it is more like a
bridge where you must be careful where to place the pillars
and how to form and compound all parts, lest it fall down.
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9 Conclusion:
The Development of a Peer Economy
We started this text by asking how far the potential of peer
production extends—production based on sharing and coopera-
tion instead of property and competition. We have found that
there is no reason why peer production should remain limited
to the niche of information goods where it first emerged. We
have seen that people can coordinate their wishes as producers
with their needs as consumers by automating unpleasant activ-
ities away; by making tasks more fun; and by weighting less
pleasant or less popular tasks higher (task auctioning), allowing
everybody to choose their own trade-off between the tasks they
want to do and the time they are willing to spend on them. We
have seen that they can distribute the results of their coopera-
tion by freely sharing what can be shared (such as information),
and by distributing non-sharable products among the contrib-
utors according to their preferences and wishes. They might
use various models such as flat rates, flat allocation, customized
production with effort-based accounting, or preference weighting
(product auctioning) to organize this internal sharing in a fair
way without restricting anybody’s choices.
People can initiate and join any such peer projects to jointly
produce the things they like to have and/or to do the things
they like to do. Peer projects can join their forces in large
distribution pools that use a shared auctioning system for tasks,
products, and resources, allowing everybody access to a wide
range of goods without having to contribute to a multiplicity
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of projects. Aside from such interest-based cooperation, the
people in any given area can cooperate locally, forming local
meta-projects to coordinate the public services and infrastruc-
ture they desire to have in their area. And projects active in
the same sector of production will often choose to coordinate
their activities and to share their experiences in prosumer as-
sociations. Thus, a society based on peer production will be
characterized by manifold cooperation both within and between
peer projects.
We have seen that a society is possible where all economic
activity is arranged in this way. In this society, production will
be driven by demand and not by profit. There will be no need
to sell anything and hence no unemployment; competition will
be more a game than a struggle for survival; there won’t be
a distinction between people with capital and those without,
or between people living in a center and those living in the
periphery. In this society, it would be silly to keep your ideas
and knowledge secret instead of sharing them; and scarcity
will no longer be a precondition of economic success, but a
problem to be worked around.
All this is possible, but will it become real?
This is a question which we cannot seriously answer since
it concerns events that have not yet occurred. We cannot
predict the future. But we can look at the past and present for
indicators. And there are positive indicators.
One is that the formulas preaching capitalism as the solution
to all the world’s problems ring more and more hollow by
the day. There is the material destitution affecting more and
more people; the widening gap between rich and poor people
and rich and poor countries; the increasing feeling of people
being left out, encouraging hate and fanaticism or resignation
and despair; the oncoming environmental disasters. People
might not yet realize that capitalism is the root cause of these
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problems, but more and more of them probably do not seri-
ously believe that it can solve them either. So far they might
be hesitant to admit this fact, even to themselves, since they
do not know of better alternatives, and an unfounded hope
is still preferable to hopelessness. But as soon as you realize
that there is an alternative, there is no reason to persist in this
self-delusion.
Another positive indicator is the astonishing and unpre-
dicted success of free software and open content, the first area
where peer production started to become apparent. Especially,
when we realize that the three arguments which applied to
the formation of free software apply here as well: the ethi-
cal argument (think Richard Stallman), the practical argument
(think Apache Foundation), and the fun argument (think Linus
Torvalds).
Stallman’s ethical argument (cf. Stallman, 2002, Chap. 1) is
that a system that prevents you from helping your neighbor (by
sharing your software with her) is wrong, and that it is absurd
if you cannot change the software you are using to fit your
needs (or those of others). Stallman argues that a system that
is absurd and ethically wrong must be rejected and changed,
explaining why he favors free software and rejects all property
in software.
The same argument can be made for peer production in-
stead of market production in general. It is absurd that people
have to live in miserable circumstances just because they don’t
manage to find paid work (which, in many cases, isn’t even of
real use to anybody); it is wrong that children have to starve
even though there is enough to eat for everybody. Markets
cannot solve these problems (they create them), but peer pro-
duction can. We have a choice between market production and
peer production, but if we want to behave ethically, we cannot
choose the former.
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The Apache Software Foundation1 represents the pragmatic
case for free software. Their flagship project, the Apache HTTP
Server2, has been the most popular Web server since 1996. This
server was originally developed by a group of webmasters who
found that they all had similar needs and problems, and who
realized that by cooperating and freely sharing the resulting
software they could address them in the most efficient way (cf.
Apache Software Foundation, 2005).
Their reasons for cooperation were purely practical—jointly
they could produce what neither of them would have been
able to produce alone—and this practical argument applies to
peer production in general. With peer production, you don’t
have to wait for some market player to offer a solution that
more or less tightly fits your problem, and you don’t need all
the capital, planning, determination, and luck that is necessary
to successfully produce and sell your own solutions on the
market. All you need is a group of other people who have
problems or desires similar to your own, and the realization
that it makes more sense for you to cooperate than to compete,
and you are ready to go.
That joint production can be fun, that it can be deeply enjoy-
able and satisfying, is probably known to everyone who has
ever tried it. The most famous representative of this fun argu-
ment is Linus Torvalds, the primary author of the Linux kernel3,
who entitled his autobiography “Just for Fun” (Torvalds and
Diamond, 2001).
In capitalism, work is seldom fun—so seldom, in fact, that
the conception that work and fun are opposites has become
deeply ingrained in people’s minds. In peer production, this
antagonism is absent. While activities are not always pure fun,
1 http://www.apache.org/
2 http://httpd.apache.org/
3 http://www.kernel.org/
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they never become the dull drudgery of capitalism (if only
because you know why you are doing something). Moreover,
with the proposed task auctioning systems, everybody will
be able to choose their preferred activities without having
to feel remorse for imposing the less agreeable activities on
others. This will probably make the open, cooperative and
self-determined style of peer production even more enjoyable
and fulfilling than it already is.
We suppose that the power of these arguments will be too
strong for people to resist, at least in the long run. And
we would not be surprised if many of the people getting
first involved will come from two groups: Those who are
worst off in the current system—because the new mode of
production offers them chances that they don’t have in the
old one. And those who are very well off—because they have
time and energy to spend on interesting new things, and peer
production is the most interesting, challenging, and fun thing
around, better than anything the traditional economy has to
offer. Together, and together with everyone else who is sick
or bored of the market or who wants to try a new and better
mode of production, they might become a strong alliance.
Of course, these concluding remarks are mere speculations
(though speculations based on arguments), since the future
has not yet been written. How society will actually evolve
depends on people’s choices and actions—mine, yours, and
everybody’s. The future depends on us.
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Appendix

A Mathematical Details of the Auctioning
Models
This appendix is meant for people who are interested in some
mathematical details of the proposed auctioning models. If
you aren’t, you can safely skip it. But don’t be afraid—the
used math is not hard, and it might help to better understand
the models.
A.1 Task Auctioning
The purpose of task auctioning is to distribute the effort that is
necessary to reach the goals of a project among all participants,
in a way that is acceptable to all and that allows everybody
to choose among the tasks they are able and willing to do
according to their own preferences.
The effort Et of a task t depends on two factors: the actual
or estimated time Tt that it takes to complete the task, and
the labor weight Lt that measures the popularity of this kind of
task (labor):
Et = Tt × Lt (A.1)
All tasks are initially assumed to be equally popular, start-
ing with Lt = 1. If there aren’t enough suitable volunteers
willing to do a task, its labor weight Lt is increased to make it
more attractive (the same time spent for the task will now be
recognized as a higher effort), until the number of volunteers
ready to do the task under these more favorable conditions
is sufficiently high. Conversely, if there are more volunteers
than necessary, Lt is decreased until sufficiently many of them
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prefer to switch to different tasks that take less of their time
(whose labor weight is higher).
How to put this auctioning system in practice? One way
would be to use a snapshot model where all contributors select
at once which tasks they are ready to do under which condi-
tions (which lower limit of Lt they consider acceptable for each
of them). The auction software then increases or decreases all
Lt∈T (T is the set of all tasks) simultaneously until it finds a
configuration with the right number of volunteers for all tasks
(if any exists). But this would require very conscious planning
from the contributors since they would have to determine their
preferences for all potentially suitable tasks at once, and there
is no guarantee that a configuration matching all tasks with
contributors exists.
Therefore an iterative model might be more suitable, where
task assignment goes through multiple iterations. At each
iteration, contributors decide which of the tasks t ∈ T they
are willing to handle assuming the current Lt values, and they
specify a lower limit of Lt they consider acceptable for each
of these tasks. If there are more contributors than required
for a task t, the system automatically decreases the value of Lt
until the number of contributors matches. But if there aren’t
enough contributors, the labor weight Lt is increased by no
more than a specific amount (e.g., +2%), even if this means
that there still aren’t enough people willing to handle it.
This allows contributors to revise their preferences in the
next iteration: those who have been dropped from their previ-
ous preferences (since the Lt value of a task has fallen below
the lower limit they considered acceptable) now have to choose
anew, stating their preferences as before but taking the up-
dated Lt values into account. They might choose one of the
not-yet-assigned “unpopular” tasks with a high Lt, or they
might decide to accept a lower Lt limit for a previously se-
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lected task (which will cause the Lt of this task to fall even
further). Each such iteration may take one day or some other
suitable unit of time—it should not be too short to prevent the
weight of unpopular tasks from increasing too quickly, but
neither should it be too long so as not to heavily delay the
execution of such tasks.
Such an iterative model is also suitable to take the natural
fluctuation in any project into account—contributors will drop
out and others will join, some tasks will be completed and
new ones will arise, contributors will become bored of their
activities and decide to try other ones. The weight of tasks
will thus be constantly in flux—which will, of course, also
influence the preferences of contributors.
How much effort will each contributor have to put into
a project? This depends on the used allocation model (cf.
Sec. 4.4.2). With flat rates (Sec. 4.4.2.1), the required summed
effort ∑t∈T Et is evenly shared among all contributors. If there
are n contributors, each of them will have to contribute the
same effort:
P =
1
n ∑t∈T
Et (flat rate) (A.2)
This is, in other words, the “price” to pay for getting access to
the (non-copyable) products produced by the project.
With flat allocation (Sec. 4.4.2.2), the required effort does not
depend on the number of contributors, but on the number of
units produced. If there are m units, the price for each of them
is
P =
1
m ∑t∈T
Et (flat allocation) (A.3)
The effort you have to contribute to the project thus depends
on the number of units you want.
For the other allocation models (production effort and pref-
erence weighting), the relative effort required for producing a
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good needs to be taken into account. This will be covered in
the next section.
A.2 Product Auctioning
Ex is the production effort that went into producing a good
x, measured in weighted hours. ∑x∈X Ex is the summed pro-
duction effort of all the goods produced by a project or dis-
tribution pool (X is the set of all produced goods). Note
that ∑x∈X Ex = ∑t∈T Et: the complete effort that goes into a
project (or a whole distribution pool) stays of course the same,
whether you slice it by produced goods or by tasks.
If accounting based on production effort (Sec. 4.4.2.3) is used,
Ex is thus also the price of good x (i.e., the effort necessary to
get it):
Px = Ex (production effort) (A.4)
If product auctioning (Sec. 4.4.2.4) is used, the price of each
product x is modified by an allocation weight Ax measuring
the product popularity. Auctions start with Ax = 1. If there
is more demand than can be satisfied, Ax is increased un-
til the number of demands willing to accept the increased
price matches the number of available products (upward auc-
tioning). Conversely, if products have been produced that
nobody wants, Ax can be decreased until there are sufficiently
many persons willing to pick them up at the reduced price
(downward auctioning).
With auctioning, a normalization factor N is necessary to
ensure that the sum of efforts put into a project/distribution
pool is equal to the summed price of its products:
∑
x∈X
Ex = ∑
x∈X
Px (A.5)
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The price of a product x is thus
Px = Ax × N × Ex (product auctioning) (A.6)
N is calculated so as to ensure that the equation (A.5) holds:1
N = ∑x∈X
Ex
∑x∈X (Ax × Ex)
(A.7)
Both upward auctioning and downward auctioning indicate
that production should be adjusted to better meet the actual de-
mand, if possible. However, there is a fundamental difference
between upward and downward: in case of upward auctions,
it is quite possible that production cannot be increased further
(or at least not without negative side effects), due to a lack of
required resources or space. However, downward auctioning
signifies that it was a mistake to produce the product in ques-
tion in the first place—nobody considers it worth the effort
that has been necessary to produce it. (A mistake in so far as
the good was produced for being used—its production might
still be justified by the pleasure and satisfaction which the
process of production gave to the producers.)
Of course, mistakes can occur (especially since prior esti-
1 Proof that (A.7) fulfills equation (A.5):
∑
x∈X
Ex = ∑
x∈X
Px
= ∑
x∈X
(Ax × N × Ex)
= N × ∑
x∈X
(Ax × Ex)
= ∑x∈X Ex
∑x∈X (Ax × Ex)
× ∑
x∈X
(Ax × Ex)
= ∑
x∈X
Ex
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mations of the effort required for production will not always
be exact), and downward auctioning is the best way to re-
cover from them. However, downward auctions pose a specific
problem for distribution pools (cf. Sec. 5.2). Since participating
projects decide on their own what they want to produce, some
of them could regularly produce things that are not “worth the
effort,” i.e., that require downward auctioning to be allocated.
By doing so, they would raise the price for all the products
produced within the distribution pool (since every Ax < 1
increases the value of the normalization factor N). Projects
could even rip off the other pooling projects by producing
goods nobody else is interested in and then acquiring them
for a price below the production effort. This would allow
the project members to use the difference between production
effort and price (∆x = Ex − Px) to acquire other goods from
the pool, without having contributed anything in return.
To avoid such situations (whether accidental or incidental),
distribution pools will probably prefer to shift the risk of
downward auctions to individual projects, by recognizing the
required effort only partially, setting the recognized effort
Rx = min(1, Ax)× Ex (A.8)
Thus, for products distributed at production effort or via
upward auctioning (Ax ≥ 1), the effort Ex is fully recognized
as contribution, but in case of downward auctions (Ax < 1),
the effort Ex is multiplied with the same weight Ax to derive
the recognized effort Rx. This means that projects better take
care that they produce products for which there is actual
demand if they want to have all their efforts recognized.
The equation that a project or distribution pool has to fulfill
to ensure that it gets enough contributions and that every
contributor gets something in return now becomes
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∑
x∈X
Rx = ∑
x∈X
Px (A.9)
The normalization factor N needs to be modified accord-
ingly:2
N = ∑x∈X
Rx
∑x∈X (Ax × Ex)
(A.10)
Note that it will still be possible to acquire products for a
price below the recognized production effort (Px < Rx), due to
the normalization factor N, which in this modified setup will
always be ≤ 1 and usually (because of upward auctioning of
some products) < 1.3 This is not a problem—popular products
being auctioned above production effort automatically reduces
the price of all other products, since the additional effort
necessary to acquire them needs to “go somewhere,” and the
only place where it can go is into the production of other
products.
A.3 Resource Auctioning
Natural resources differ from products in requiring no human
effort to produce them: Ey = 0 for all resources y ∈ Y, the set
of available resources. When resources are made available in
2 Proof that (A.10) fulfills equation (A.9): analogous to the proof that (A.7)
fulfills (A.5).
3 Rx ≤ (Ax × Ex) holds for every x ∈ X:
Rx = min(1, Ax)× Ex = Ax × Ex if A < 1 (downward auctioning)
Rx = min(1, Ax)× Ex = 1× Ex= Ax × Ex if A = 1 (production effort)
Rx = min(1, Ax)× Ex = 1× Ex< Ax × Ex if A > 1 (upward auctioning)
Therefore, N = ∑x∈X Rx∑x∈X(Ax×Ex) will be 1 if upward auctioning is never used,
and < 1 if it is used for some x.
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a distribution pool in addition to products, the equation that
needs to be fulfilled therefore becomes:
∑
x∈X
Rx = ∑
x∈X
Px + ∑
y∈Y
Py (A.11)
Since resources don’t take any production effort, but some of
them will usually draw a non-zero price Py, they will automat-
ically decrease the price Px of products.
For the same reason, there is no upward or downward auc-
tioning of resources: since there is no production effort to
recover, resource auctions can start with an initial price Py = 0.
If the demand for a resource is below or equal the available
amount, every bidder gets the resource at this price, i.e., for
free. Otherwise Py is increased until the remaining demand
matches the availability (the resulting Py will be slightly higher
than the highest bid that cannot be satisfied). Analogously to
task and product auctions, it might be reasonable to use an
iterative model, where unsuccessful bidders can re-estimate
their valuation of the resource and increase their bid. The auc-
tion ends when the set of successful bidders hasn’t changed
during one iteration.
A.4 Virtual Effort
In the text we mentioned two instances where the people
participating in distribution pools might decide to recognize
virtual effort—effort that hasn’t actually been spent but that can
be used to acquire products and resources. Virtual effort may
be granted to persons who are exempted from contributing (cf.
Sec. 8.1.1) to allow them to get products and resources in the
same way as contributors; and it may be granted to the locals
of especially popular places where the auctioning of grounds
and houses leads to increased prices (cf. Sec. 8.3.1).
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Virtual effort makes people eligible for products and re-
sources in the same way as actually contributed and recog-
nized effort. Therefore, the summed price of products and
resources must equal the sum of all recognized actual and all
virtual effort. If Ve is the virtual effort a person e is eligible for,
and E is the set of all eligible people, equation (A.11) must be
modified as follows:
∑
x∈X
Rx +∑
e∈E
Ve = ∑
x∈X
Px + ∑
y∈Y
Py (A.12)
The actual size of ∑e∈E Ve depends on the conditions of
granting virtual effort. Above (Sec. 8.1.1) we discussed two
models of granting virtual effort to persons exempted from
contributing. The first was to consider non-contributors as
“average” contributors. Thus, we have to splice the recognized
effort contributed to a distribution pool by contributors c ∈ C,
instead of by produced goods x ∈ X or by required tasks t ∈ T.
Of course, this does not change the effort itself:
∑
c∈C
Rc = ∑
x∈X
Rx = ∑
t∈T
Rt (A.13)
The average recognized effort is R¯C = 1|C| ∑c∈C Rc, where |C|
is the size of the set C, i.e., the number of contributors. This
average will be granted as virtual effort to each non-contributor
eligible for this scheme:
Ve = R¯C =
1
|C| ∑c∈C
Rc (contributor average) (A.14)
The discussed alternative was to entitle each ex-contributor
to virtual effort equivalent to her personal recognized contribu-
tions averaged over her active years (or over a subset of them,
say the last ten years). If Re1 , Re2 , . . . , Ren is the recognized
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effort contributed by e during the n relevant years, and if this
second scheme is used, the virtual effort to which e will be
entitled will be her personal average over these years:
Ve = R¯e =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Rei (personal average) (A.15)
For people who have never contributed anything, such as
children and other people fulfilling some exemption criterion
since their birth, only the first scheme will be possible. The
second might be more suitable for ex-contributors: people who
have contributed in the past but cannot any longer, e.g., due to
old age or illness. Of course, the local associations participating
in a distribution pool might decide to use other schemes,
for example to grant each ex-contributor the maximum of the
contributor average and her personal average, i.e., to apply the
scheme which leads to more virtual effort being granted.
The second instance where we mentioned virtual effort con-
cerned the auctioning of grounds and houses as a regulation
mechanism for migration (Sec. 8.3.1). The open auction of
grounds and houses in a distribution pool will lead to higher
prices in popular places, therefore reducing their attractiveness
for potential immigrants and mitigating their risk of becoming
overcrowded—but it likewise affects the people who have been
born there and want to stay. This can be partially compen-
sated by calculating how much additional effort the locals of a
community have to spend due to their community being pop-
ular, and to give (say) half of this effort back as virtual effort.
Thus they would only have to make actual contributions for
half of the additional effort required, while the other half is
unconditionally granted to them.
To arrange such a scheme it will be necessary to first define
who is a local. A sensible way of doing so would be to regard
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as locals of any specific local community all the people who
lived there several years ago (e.g., five years ago), regardless
of whether they still live there or whether they have moved
elsewhere. In this way, immigrants won’t be considered as
immigrants forever (which would be hard to justify), but will
automatically become locals after some years.
Second, it is necessary to find out how much additional
effort (if any) the locals of a community have to spend due to
the open auctioning of the grounds and houses in their area.
This can be done by complementing the actual auctioning of
grounds and houses with a shadow auction where only the bids
of locals are considered. Let PGH be the summed price of
all grounds and houses situated in a local community in the
actual auction; and P∗GH the summed price that would have
resulted for these grounds and houses in the shadow auction.
We can now determine whether the locals of the respective
community have to pay higher prices for being popular by
calculating
∆GH = PGH − P∗GH (A.16)
Since the shadow auction simulates the fictitious situation
that no migration takes place, it will also need to include bids
from locals that in reality have moved elsewhere (and hence
are no longer bidding). This can be done by repeating the last
bids that locals made prior to moving away.
If ∆GH is positive, the locals did have to spend additional
effort due to the popularity of their community. If 50% of this
effort are given back to the locals and if there are n locals, the
virtual effort granted to each local e of the concerned local
community will be
Ve =
0.5
n
∆GH (local of popular community) (A.17)
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(Of course, if e happens to be exempted, she will additionally
be granted virtual effort due to her personal or the contributor
average as discussed above.)
It makes sense to distribute this virtual effort among all the
locals of a community, regardless of where they live now. Oth-
erwise people would be disadvantaged by moving from one
local community to another one of similar popularity (maybe
just the neighboring community), which would unnecessar-
ily impede migration. Always granting people the virtual
effort due to the locals of the community where they lived five
years ago will encourage people to move from popular to less
popular places, and it will cause people to think twice before
they move in the other direction. Thus it will counteract the
“natural” popularity of different places, just as intended.
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